Southwest Area McGrath Reorganization Documents

Contents:

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SW Area 1992 Analysis.pdf

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SOUTHWEST AREA OFFICE

I. OWNERSHIP

Ownership is a mix of federal agency, state, village, and regional native corporation lands. Federal agencies include U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Bureau of Land Management. The private lands include a mix of native allotments, which are managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs: homesteads, home sites, and mining claims.

II. FIRE MANAGEMENT PROTECTION

The area protects 66.5 MM acres. The breakdown of acres by protection level is as follows:

Full	16.6 MM acres (25%)
Modified	16.6 MM acres (25%)
Limited	33.3 MM acres (50%)
TOTAL	66.5 MM acres

Critical sites - Critical sites are sparse and located along the river corridors. Several critical sites are located in the hills and mountains where significant mining activity is occurring.

III. FIRE OCCURRENCE AND FREQUENCY

Fire season is compressed, beginning in early June and ending by mid-July most years. However, large fires ignited during this period continue to burn until snowfall. A few (less than 25%) person caused fires occur during the season, often in May before the lightning season. Most of these fires are located in the far western portion of the area and are associated with musk rat hunters; and trash and debris burning around villages. The balance of the fire workload is lightning caused.

IV. FIRE BEHAVIOR POTENTIAL

Vast areas are covered with unbroken vegetation. These large areas of continuous fuels produce extremely large fires. Several fires each year exceed 100,000 acres and fires over 300,000 acres are not uncommon. Extreme fire behavior can occur throughout the months of June and July. This extreme fire behavior is characterized by flame lengths reaching over 100 feet, long range spotting and ground dependent crown fires.

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Exhibit 1 1992 Analysis.pdf

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EXHIBIT #1

PROTECTION AREAS BY ACRES
(MILLIONS)

STATE PROTECTION AREA	TOTAL ACRES	FIRE PRONE ACRES
A. STATE		
State and Private	68.8	68.3
Federal and Native	65.2	28.1
Protection Area Total	134.0*	96.4
* This excludes the Aleutian Chain		
B. BLM		
State and Private	41.5	36.6
Federal and Native	92.5	88.4
Protection Area Total	134.0*	125.0
* This excludes the North Slope		
C. FOREST SERVICE		
State and Private	7.7	1.0
Federal and Native	24.5	3.0
Protection Area Total	32.2	4.0

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United States Department of the Interior

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
ALASKA FIRE SERVICE
P.O. BOX 35005
FT. WAINWRIGHT, ALASKA 99703-0005

9200 (310)

26 FEB 1991

Frenchie Malotte
Division of Forestry
Department of Natural Resources
P.O. Box 107005
Anchorage, Alaska 99510

Dear Mr. Malotte:

In response to your letter of January 30, 1991 regarding smokejumper support for this coming fire season, we provide the following operational summary on how the proposal will work, and address the specific concerns you have mentioned.

Essentially the State will up front pay the average cost of one smokejumper aircraft. This is determined by calculating the total availability costs of our smokejumper fleet and dividing by the number of aircraft. This figure will be adjusted yearly as costs change. This presuppression expenditure will essentially buy the State into the program. Personnel and aircraft use costs will be handled one of two ways: (1) Presuppression Costs (standby, weekend manning, extended manning, preposition flights, etc.) will be charged against a specifically designated project number that will allow end-of-year summation for reimbursement and (2) Suppression Costs (personnel time, aircraft flight time, etc.) will be charged against the appropriate fire number as has been historically done.

Operationally the smokejumpers will be handled as in the past. The Fire Coordination Center Shift Coordinator is delegated the responsibility to make routine in-state suppression and presuppression dispatches. These decisions will be made with full input from our respective FMOs, commensurate with general fire plan, and managerial guidance. The State will be given first priority for dispatch of smokejumpers you have placed on standby status. In the absence of smokejumpers being placed on standby by the State, dispatches to the State will be based upon availability as specified in our cooperative agreement. The dispatch of smokejumpers and any other of our resources out-of-state requires specific approval of the Manager or Associate Manager. As part of this decision making process, the State will be fully consulted with (normally the Operations Forester) and your concerns taken into consideration. It should be understood that while both of our organizations

STATE OF ALASKA

WALTER J. HICKEL, GOVERNOR

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

DIVISION OF FORESTRY

P.O. BOX 7-005
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA 99510
PHONE: (907) 762-2501

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Maw/Vorce - See me - prior to drafting a response. Frisel

BLM, Alaska Fire Service
Mr. Gene Schloemer, Manager
P.O. Box 3505
Ft. Wainwright, AK 99703

January 30,1991

9-2100

Dear Gene:

Our meeting on January, 18, 1991 to discuss a variety of interagency issues identified at last years fire review was quite productive. It was very open and it is apparent we are meeting our joint goal of improving interagency operations. One of the topics we discussed was smokejumper support to the Division during field season 1991. This issue requires follow-up and clarification.

The Division accepts in principal the "Vorce option" for the 1991 season. The basis for this option obligates the Division to contribute $333,000 to joint fund the smokejumper fleet as a buy in to the program, followed with a "pay as you go" arrangement on the use of the jumpers. This is a good idea with the potential to save money and improve the overall effectiveness of the program.

We do feel however, that the absence of firm operational control of a contingent of jumpers by the Division within the proposal is a serious flaw. The past practice of paying for one delivery system and 16 jumpers provided some measure of decision authority to the state when sending "state" jumpers on assignment. Past requests from BIFC to release jumpers for L-48 assignments, use as Crew Representatives and Agency Crew Coordinators, etc. are pressures we well recognize and which can be detrimental to state interests. Without some voice in the decision process, the state stands to lose the jumpers when we feel they should stay.

At this point, the Division is convinced we need to have a similar level of control as in the past. We are willing to fund the additional costs to retain a measure of security on jumper coverage. I feel we should use the "Vorce option" and provide for our concerns in the supplemental agreement. If this is not possible, it will be necessary to renegotiate the state's involvement for this coming fire season.

Thank You for you cooperative attitude in helping the division meet its fire management goals and responsibilities.

Frenchie Malotte
Chief, Fire Management

cc: Dean Brown, Deputy Director Operations
Joe Stam, Fire Operations Forester
F-1

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Microsoft Word - Write-up_ANCSA Sec 21_ANILCA Sec1409

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Alaska Native Regional and Village Corporation Lands
and
Wildland Fire Protection Services

BLM-AFS was delegated the responsibility to provide wildland fire protection services to Alaska Native regional and village corporation lands conveyed under the ***Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 1971(ANCSA)*** in Department of Interior Manual 620 Chapter 2 Section 2.4:

> "...BLM is authorized to provide safe, cost-effective emergency wildland fire suppression services in support of land, natural and cultural resource management plans on Department of the Interior administered land ***and on those lands that require protection under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, as amended*** (43 U.S.C.1620(e)), herein after referred to as Native land..."

Sec 21(e) of ANCSA is the original citation that provides for wildland fire protection services on those lands. ***Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 1980 (ANILCA)*** references and supports this section. The original ANCSA language used the term 'forest fire'; ANILCA amended that to 'wildland fire.'

ANSCA Section 21(e) as amended:

> "Real Property interests conveyed pursuant to this Act to a Native individual, Native group, corporations organized under section 14(h)(3) or Village or Regional Corporation shall, so long as the fee therein remains not subject to State or local taxes on real estate, continue to be regarded as public lands for the purpose of computing the Federal share of any highway project pursuant to title 23 of the United State Code as amended and supplemented for the purpose of the Johnson-O'Malley Act of April 16, 1934, as amended (25 USC 452) and for the purpose of Public Law 815 and 874. 81st Congress (64 Stat 967.110), and ***so long as there are no substantial revenues from such lands, they shall continue to receive wildland fire protection services from the United States at no cost.***"

Codified in 43CFR2650.1(c):

> "As provided in section 21(e) of the Act, so long as there are no substantial revenues from real property interests conveyed pursuant to this Act and the lands are not subject to State and local real property taxes, ***such lands shall continue to receive forest fire protection services from the United States at no cost.*** The Secretary will promulgate criteria, after consultation with the concerned Native corporations and the State of Alaska, for determining when substantial revenues are accruing as to lands for which forest fire protection services are furnished by the Department of the Interior and no discontinuance of such service will be ordered by the Secretary unless he finds, after notice and opportunity for submission of views, that such discontinuance is in conformity with the criteria."

Section 22(f) of ANCSA is quoted as the land exchange authority that s has been interpreted to afford the provisions of ANCSA to exchanged land if the exchange consolidates holdings., i.e. fire wildland fire protection services at no cost applies on those lands.

Section 2

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Alaska Fire Service Program Review January 2003.pdf

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BLM FIRE OPS

Alaska Fire Program Review
January, 2003

Findings, Discussions, and Recommendations

1. Alaska Fire Service Mission

Finding: The Alaska Fire Service (AFS) mission, and the roles and responsibilities of many employees and functions of the AFS, are inadequately defined to provide for sound program management and to ensure effective relationships with users.

Discussion: The AFS is a service organization. Authorizing direction is provided in 620 DM 2.4, which states that

> "BLM will maintain and operate the Department of the Interior wildland fire suppression organization in Alaska with the primary intention of providing cost-effective suppression services and minimizing unnecessary duplication of suppression systems for Department of the Interior agencies. BLM will also provide consistency in State and Native wildland fire relationships and provide Statewide mobility of wildland fire resources."

The mission is defined in the context of "fire suppression" services. Although 620 DM 2 was updated in 1998 from 910 DM 3, it does not adequately address many fire management activities identified in the 2001 update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Policy and in the 2001 National Fire Plan (NFP). The AFS has undertaken new fire management activities, such as planning, hazardous fuels management, wildland-urban interface hazard mitigation, rural fire assistance, community assistance, and wildland fire use, in response to the Policy and the NFP. The AFS has done so without adequate written guidance specific to its role as an interagency organization, and without adequate written guidance concerning its roles and responsibilities within the BLM.

Recommendation:

a. The BLM should seek revision of Departmental policy in 620 DM 2. Revised policy should include specific reference to fire management activities authorized by federal wildland fire management policy.

b. The Alaska State Office and the AFS should develop an AFS mission statement that is consistent with language in Departmental policy.

2. AFS Organizational Development

Finding: AFS organizational development and expansion has not been based on accurately identified and articulated user requirements.

Discussion: To the credit of the AFS, the organization has been flexible and innovative in its efforts to meet perceived fire management needs. Some organizational expansion actions were in response to 1995 Federal Fire Policy and National Fire Plan requirements, which included direction in areas such as hazardous fuels management, wildland-urban interface hazard mitigation, rural fire assistance, community assistance, and wildland fire use. In addition, the AFS has developed capabilities to provide support services to BLM Field Offices beyond the fire suppression mission.

These actions have contributed to confusion in the Alaska fire management and land management communities. Roles and responsibilities of employees and functions of the AFS are often unclear to land managers, including BLM land managers, and to the AFS management

team, including the AFS Zone Fire Management Officers. Organizational responses initiated by AFS to meet fire management needs are not aligned with delegated authorities in 620 DM 2, nor do they necessarily meet the stated requirements of land managers who may be targeted for the services. Those organizational responses include 1) development of fuels management positions in the three fire management zones and in the southern service area, and 2) establishment of a safety, planning, environmental and health coordination office that includes a fuels management specialist, a medic program leader, a fire ecologist, a planning and environmental coordinator, and a hazardous materials coordinator.

Recommendation:

a. Representatives from the State Office, Field Offices and AFS should clarify and document mutual support relationships.
b. Representatives from the State Office, Field Offices and AFS should incorporate detailed descriptions of applicable AFS-Field Office relationships in the statewide fire management plan.
c. AFS and Field Office representatives should jointly develop and document specific support services that AFS is providing, including expectations for reimbursement or cost sharing by the Field Offices. AFS should schedule periodic feedback sessions to ensure that Field Office needs are being met.
d. Prior to creating new or expanded fire management capabilities AFS and the land managers AFS provides services to should establish and document that there is support and sufficient workload for those capabilities.
e. BLM National Office of Fire and Aviation should approve funding requests for additional AFS positions that satisfy workload requirements established and documented by AFS and the land managers AFS serves.
f. AFS should ensure that AFS employee roles and responsibilities are consistent with 620 DM 2 policy and language.

3. Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group Representation

Finding: The BLM would be more effectively served by having someone other than an AFS employee represent its interests on the Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group (AWFCG).

Discussion: The interagency Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group (AWFCG) consists of selected agency and native organization representatives who are delegated authority from agency leadership to make wildland fire management decisions. Bureau representatives do this in accordance with respective Bureau policies as specified in 620 DM 2.7. BLM is the only organization in the group that is a land management agency and has direct authority for providing suppression services on non-BLM Department of Interior lands. When the AFS manager, whose program provides service to multiple DOI agencies, also represents BLM specific interests as the BLM State Office representative to the AWFCG, conflicts of interest can occur. Simultaneously representing multiple agency interests as a service provider and BLM specific interests as a land management representative cannot be done objectively. The AWFCG charter addresses single representatives with delegated authority for participating land manager/owners, but does not preclude additional representatives from the same organization attending meetings and participating on established committees.

Recommendation: The BLM State Director should designate an individual outside the AFS to represent BLM land managers on the AWFCG in order to ensure that BLM land management

needs are addressed. AFS should participate in the AWFCG in an ad hoc capacity to represent the suppression interests of the agencies it serves.

4. Support Cost Surcharges

Finding: The February 1, 2002 FMAP update request for $1,400,000 for support cost charges to reflect the full 10% allowable surcharges by the State Office cannot be validated.

Discussion: The Annual Work Plan (AWP) Guidance states that "Indirect costs, including the program support charges to Fire Preparedness (Subactivity 2810), will be limited to no more than 10 percent of the statewide 2810 cost target." This charge is commonly referred to as the "administrative support surcharge". Prior to Fiscal Year 2002, the AFS was being charged a flat rate equivalent to two percent for the administrative support surcharge. Each state receives funding for this surcharge in the AWP as part of the baseline funding. Alaska requested $339,475.00 in the 1998 Fire Management Plan (FMP Table 6), which was fully funded. In the Fiscal Year 2001 AWP this amount was increased to $500,000 (which equates to three percent) to cover inflation and additional allocation. No state has received increased funding for the administrative support surcharge since FY 2001 due to funding constraints. The Alaska State Budget Office began charging the AFS the full 10% administrative support charge in Fiscal Year 2002 based on a 2810 allocation of $16,570,000.00. The 10% administrative surcharge is to be calculated on 2810 base funding only. Based on this funding level, the 10% surcharge was $1,657,000.00. After negotiation, the Alaska State Budget Office gave the AFS credit in the amount of $674,000 for fixed costs that it pays. This covered costs for statewide telephones ($228,000), equipment rental and maintenance ($144,000), janitorial and grounds maintenance ($240,000), and other utility, service, and supply costs. These costs are credited toward the 10% administrative support surcharge. These credited fixed costs of $674,000, in addition to the $500,000 previously funded in the AWP for the administrative support surcharge, total $1,174,000. Subtracting this from the requested $1,657,000 indicates that the unfunded amount is actually $483,000.

The AFS provides its own support in the areas of information technology, communications, and external affairs and feels it should receive credit from the Alaska Budget Office for this support. Information technology, communications, and external affairs staffs residing in the fire program is somewhat unique when compared to other states, however, it is not unique within Alaska. For example, the conveyance and minerals programs both fund their own information technology staffs and, in addition, pay an administrative support surcharge. The state budget office believes that AFS should continue to fund these staffs out of their base funding because they serve primarily AFS purposes.

Recommendation: The AFS and the Alaska State Office should establish and implement an accurate and consistent method of negotiating, calculating, and paying the administrative support surcharge.

5. Budget Tracking

Finding: AFS budget tracking is inadequate to ensure accurate accounting of fire program expenditures.

Discussion: The budget analyst position for the AFS resides in AK-328, Administrative Services Branch, Support Services Group. The responsibility for the AFS budget falls under AK-313, Safety, Planning, Environmental, Health and specifically under the Fire Staff Officer. This is inefficient due to the size and complexity of the AFS program budget. Dividing the

budget responsibilities between the Fire Staff Office and the Administrative Services Branch does not provide adequate direction to manage the budget effectively. Additionally, the budget analyst is responsible for the charge card program and spends approximately 60% of her time on that program.

Recommendation:

a. The AFS should align the budget function into one functional area and establish a direct line of authority from the budget function to the manager.
b. The AFS budget analyst position should be dedicated to full-time budgetary duties and the charge card program duties should be reassigned.

6. Budget Relationship Between AFS and the Alaska State Office

Finding: Budget management procedures used by AFS and the Alaska State Office are inadequate to accurately manage the AFS budget.

Discussion: The Alaska State Office does not receive budget input from AFS adequate to facilitate long range planning for the BLM. The Alaska State Office does not understand the fuels and deferred maintenance budget since AFS provides no targets for the budget process. This causes concerns about the ability of the Field Offices to plan ahead on a yearly basis for the fuels and maintenance programs, such as planning for engineering staff. The Alaska State Office expresses concerns about a lack of communication between the Field Offices, the State Office, and AFS regarding budget matters.

Part of the poor communication is attributed to how fuels accomplishments and budget are reported through the National Fire Plan Operations and Reporting System (NFPORS) instead of Management Information System (MIS). Another issue is the State Budget Office's lack of understanding of the role of AFS as a DOI suppression organization. AFS funding comes through the BLM, but AFS has DOI operational responsibilities. AFS and the State Budget Office should improve mutual communication and understanding of fire program budget issues. They should also ensure that all communications with the Washington Office go through the State Budget Office.

Recommendation: AFS Budget Staff and the Alaska State Office Budget Officer should establish, document, and implement budget management procedures that adequately address fire program budget development and implementation.

7. AFS Fuels Management Program

Finding: AFS roles and responsibilities in fire management activities such as prescribed fire, other fuels treatments, fire planning and other fire uses are not clear on lands for which BLM has land management responsibilities. AFS roles in these areas of fire management are also unclear on native corporation lands for which BLM has suppression responsibilities.

Discussion: Departmental policy and guidance clearly defines the AFS role as fire suppression. Fire management responsibilities, in contrast to suppression activities, are to remain with the land managing organization. With respect to BLM activities in the fuels management programs (2823 & 2824 programs) the AFS has assumed the State Office role of program development and oversight. BLM Field Offices are responsible for initiating and planning fuels treatment activities but AFS has provided assistance in these endeavors as well. The AFS has done a good job in keeping fuels related positions funded from fuels projects rather than from fuels program base funding. This keeps overhead costs tied to program accomplishments and avoids the potential for paying fuels program overhead costs with few or no accomplishments. Currently,

only the AFS position identified as the State Fuels Management Specialist receives a significant amount of position funding from the 2823 program. But the BLM Field Offices and the AFS do not share a mutual understanding as to who is responsible for fuels program development and implementation. For example, the AFS Zone Fuels Specialists positions are primarily funded from the 2810 program since the majority of their work involves suppression related activities and not fuels management activities. As a result of this, there is no sound overall development and oversight of the BLM fuels program.

With the exception of the Military and Southern Zones the potential fuels management workload is relatively light in the AFS Fire Management Zones. This is primarily due to the longer fire regimes found in Alaska and to the use of the "limited" fire management option. Where fuels management workload does exist, the prescribed fire season directly coincides with the Alaska wildland fire season. Since the primary AFS mission is fire suppression, this concurrent workload may lead to conflicts and typically results in resources being utilized in fire suppression roles with no resources remaining to continue fuels management program activities.
Recommendation: The BLM State Office, the Field Offices, and the AFS should review the fuels management program to accurately establish the workload. The roles and responsibilities of all parties with respect to the fuels management program should be clearly identified and documented. Duplication of roles and responsibilities should be avoided. AFS should ensure that adequate resources remain dedicated to established fuels management program needs, including those on native corporation lands, during the fire season.

8. Prescribed Fire for Resource Benefits

Finding: Policy is inadequate regarding use of 2823 program funds to conduct prescribed burns on native corporation lands when the primary objective is for resource management.
Discussion: The March 28, 2000 memorandum from the BLM Director of Fire and Aviation to the BLM Alaska State Director regarding "Coordinated Fuels Activities in Alaska" addresses the BLM fuels management role on native corporation lands. The memorandum states that the "BLM, through their fire protection responsibilities, has a role with village lands." Fire managers and AFS users are uncertain as to whether fuels program funding can be used for resource management objectives other than hazard fuels reduction, or for hazardous fuels reduction only. The March 28, 2000 OF&A memorandum is unclear on this matter. BLM policy allows fuels treatment projects where resource management is the primary objective to be funded from the 2823 program, although these projects are low in national priority. Departmental policy directs funding on a priority basis to the wildland-urban interface and to areas in condition classes 2 or 3 in Fire Regimes I, II, and III. The national policy does not strictly prohibit use of 2823 funding for resource management burns.
Recommendation: The BLM National Office of Fire and Aviation should clarify the policy for utilizing 2823 program funding on native corporation lands. In addition to the State Office and AFS, this clarified policy should be shared with Alaska federal land managers with fuels program responsibility and with key individuals representing native corporations or native non-profit organizations.

9. Wildland Fire Use

Finding: The Alaska Interagency Wildland Fire Management Plan (AIWFMP) does not address wildland fire use to sufficiently meet the objectives of the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. The roles and responsibilities of the federal land managers and of the AFS, USFS, and

State of Alaska suppression organizations are not adequately defined to manage wildland fires for resource benefits according to established interagency policy.

Discussion: The AIWFMP addresses a full range of management responses, from surveillance to protection of human lives and inhabited property. While recognizing the ecological benefits of wildland fire, the AIWFMP does not specifically refer to wildland fire use, nor does it provide guidance relative to wildland fire as established in the interagency Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management Policy Implementation Procedures Reference Guide (August 1998). Land management and suppression agencies in Alaska have differing policies on wildland fire use. Some of the federal land management plans address the need to manage wildland fires for resource benefits. Wildland fires managed under the "limited" fire management option may achieve the same result. However, these fires are not adequately addressed by national fire reporting databases that truly reflect their intent and distinguish them from unwanted wildland fires. Additionally, line officer interaction with the suppression organization in the development of a Wildland Fire Implementation Plan (WFIP) in most cases has not occurred. The development of a WFIP provides for land manager involvement with decision criteria, periodic fire assessment, and other components of the plan in order to ensure land management objectives are met. Management of wildland fires with the WFIP process could potentially provide opportunities to manage wildland fires for resource benefits in fire management options other than "limited".

Recommendation:

a. The AFS should request that the Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group (AWFCG) develop an addendum to the AIWFMP to include procedures, guidelines and suppression agency roles for wildland fire use relative to existing fire management options. The addendum should be jointly prepared and signed by the land managers/owners that would be participating in a Wildland Fire Use program. The addendum should be developed according to procedures established in the interagency Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management Policy Implementation Procedures Reference Guide (1998).
b. The AFS (representing all the DOI fire agencies) and the State of Alaska DNR should develop an addendum to the AIWFMP that accurately defines the role of State DNR in wildland fire use. Performance expectations should be incorporated into the Reciprocal Fire Protection Agreement and Annual Operating Agreement between the State of Alaska and the AFS.
c. The AFS should establish or update existing agreements between involved parties and the AFS to accurately state specific performance expectations regarding implementation of a wildland fire use program.

10. AFS Support of Military Fire Use

Finding: Natural resource personnel for US Army properties (Ft. Wainwright, Ft. Greeley, and Ft. Richardson) would like the AFS to provide expanded services in wildland fire use and prescribed fire.

Discussion: Natural resource personnel for US Army properties (Ft. Wainwright, Ft. Greeley, and Ft. Richardson) stated that AFS does an excellent job with fire suppression. Military natural resource managers understand the priority AFS places on suppression operations and realize the windows for prescribed fire are small, but they have a growing need to apply fire in the black spruce and grass ecosystems. The military might consider funding a fire use management module to be managed by AFS. The module's primary function would be fire use. Use of the

module for suppression operations would only occur under extreme fire conditions and based on prior agreement. The military could develop and provide qualified firefighters and security personnel and the AFS could provide management oversight.
Recommendation: AFS, in conjunction with the military, should develop a fire use module if it is established that doing so would effectively and efficiently support Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy objectives.

11. AFS and DNR Cooperation

Finding: The operating agreement between the State of Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the AFS is not adequate to ensure efficient interagency fire management.
Discussion: On the ground firefighting efforts are generally safe and effective. However, many policy, planning, and management issues need work. DNR leadership is not satisfied with the level of communication between DNR and AFS. DNR leadership states that many decisions are made unilaterally by AFS. For example, when airtankers were moved to the lower 48 in the 2002 fire season, DNR did not feel that it was part of the decision. Decision-making bodies such as Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group (AWFCG) and the Alaska Interagency Coordination Center (AICC) do not function to the DNR's satisfaction. Actions could be taken to improve communications and to better articulate the responsibilities and commitments of each party. For example, the operating agreement could be reviewed for detail and validity, consequences of non-compliance could be spelled out, daily tactical planning meetings at AICC could include equal representation from cooperating agencies, and DNR could consider adding a person to the initial attack desk at AICC to represent DNR interests.
Recommendation:

a. The operating agreement between the State of Alaska Department of Natural Resources and AFS should be revised to include detailed and measurable performance objectives in order to ensure efficient interagency fire management.
b. AICC daily tactical meetings should include the AICC manager, one BLM, one USFS, one DNR representative, and no one else.

12. Protection Area Exchange Between DNR and AFS

Finding: State of Alaska DNR has requested a reevaluation of AFS and DNR protection areas in order to resolve outstanding issues related to protection areas and to improve fire management efficiency.
Discussion: The DNR desires a reevaluation of protection areas. AFS is primarily a remote wildland fire suppression organization and DNR is evolving into a roadside and wildland urban interface protection organization. AFS is organized for remote fire operations (smokejumpers) while DNR is organized for roadside and wildland urban interface operations (engines and helicopters). Protection area exchanges could lead to less conflict and to a more efficient fire program. An example would be areas west of McGrath (remote) converting to AFS protection and areas around Chicken and Eagle (roadside) converting to DNR protection. The underlying tenets behind the North/South split could be reviewed in light of ongoing land ownership changes. A protection exchange effort could lead to improved efficiencies in AFS and DNR fire program infrastructure and funding (cache operations, timing of interagency training, equipment development, air tactical needs).
Recommendation: BLM and DNR should identify and implement protection area exchanges in order to improve fire program effectiveness and efficiency for both agencies. When the

Reciprocal Fire Protection Agreement between BLM and DNR is updated (scheduled April 2003), protection area exchanges should be identified as a priority. An analysis of protection exchange possibilities should be conducted by an independent entity that could make unbiased recommendations to the AFS and the State of Alaska DNR.

13. Smokejumper Operations

Finding:

a. The current AFS smokejumper aircraft configuration of four aircraft is adequate for mission requirements. Additional funding is required for one of those aircraft.
b. Current Alaska Fire Service smokejumper headcount is adequate for the mission.

Discussion: The February 1, 2002 AFS budget update requested $900,000 per year to contract two replacement aircraft for two BLM Sherpas that were withdrawn from service. The withdrawn aircraft had been used as smokejumper and logistics platforms. The withdrawn aircraft were replaced by contracting one smokejumper aircraft and by acquiring one logistics aircraft though an exchange agreement with the U.S. Forest Service, Region 6. Funding is required for the one contracted aircraft, but not for the USFS aircraft. If the USFS replaces its Sherpas, AFS should consider establishing a new exchange agreement or seek additional funding at that time.

Historical use and availability records indicate no clear need for additional smokejumpers in Alaska. During the normal Alaska fire season, national demand for smokejumpers is generally low, and availability of lower 48 smokejumpers is high. These jumpers are available to Alaska and can be made available earlier by agreement. During the normal lower 48 fire season, national demand for smokejumpers often exceeds availability, at which time agency managers make resource allocation decisions.

Users expressed a desire to have smokejumpers that were trained and experienced in Alaska specific tactics. This can be accomplished without increasing Alaska smokejumper headcount by better managing jumper distribution and by providing Alaska specific tactical training to incoming jumpers.

Recommendation:

a. The National Office of Fire and Aviation should approve funding for one AFS smokejumper aircraft to replace the withdrawn BLM Sherpa to maintain the current configuration.
b. AFS should maintain the current smokejumper headcount.
c. AFS should develop formalized training in Alaska specific tactics and provide it to lower 48 smokejumpers. If determined necessary, this should be incorporated into the ICS system.
d. AFS should manage smokejumper distribution to ensure that users receive jumpers experienced and trained in Alaska specific tactics. Jumpers should be assigned according to ICS qualifications and user needs.

14. Aerial Supervision Module (ASM)

Finding: Necessity of basing an ASM module in Alaska has not been adequately established.

Discussion: Managers and users expressed varying opinions as to the need for an ASM module based at Ft. Wainwright. The current operating agreement between the BLM and State DNR states that DNR will provide two crewed ASM platforms and BLM will provide one crewed ASM platform. AFS is unable to qualify an ASM pilot. The BLM National Aviation Office

(NAO) will provide a crewed ASM for the 2003 fire season, but AFS will be unable to meet the same agreement requirements in 2004.
Recommendation: The NAO and the AFS should determine whether an ASM module is required in Alaska. The AFS and the State of Alaska DNR should incorporate any ASM changes into the annual operating agreement.

15. Pilots

Finding: AFS has more pilots than its mission can justify.
Discussion: There are currently four fixed-wing line pilots and one supervisory pilot in the AFS aviation organization. With the loss of the ASM platform and the withdrawal of the BLM Sherpas there is no longer a requirement for this many pilot positions. The only full-time pilot assignment for the 2003 fire season is for a single-pilot photo aircraft based out of Anchorage (April - September). There are part-time duties for one photo aircraft back-up pilot and for two USFS Sherpa relief pilots (part of the USFS/AFS Sherpa exchange agreement), but this does not justify the current pilot numbers. Additionally, training and deploying BLM pilots on aircraft that have been withdrawn from BLM service is not efficient. The February 1, 2002 AFS budget update request states that "as these remaining pilot positions become vacant they will be evaluated for need," acknowledging that the positions are surplus to requirements. The BLM National Aviation Office is not satisfied with this and desires a more accelerated schedule. This situation could be prevented in the future by better evaluation and development of pilot and aircraft requirements.
Recommendation:

a. The AFS should assist excess pilots in finding other work or reassign them.
b. The National Aviation Office should manage aircraft exchange agreements and pilot development programs.

16. Land Use Planning:

Finding: BLM land use plans do not provide adequate direction for wildland fire management.
Discussion: Federal Fire policies require that land use plans provide direction for wildland fire management to ensure that the wildland fire program is integrated with resource goals and objectives and to ensure that wildland fire plays its role as a natural ecological process. Not all BLM land in Alaska is covered by land use planning documents, and some of the existing land use plans are early-generation Management Framework Plans that have little wildland fire direction. BLM has issued guidance for States to update by the end of FY 2004 land use planning documents that are not consistent with the Federal Fire Policy. The AFS, Field Office Managers and the State Office recognize this land use planning deficiency and are initiating a statewide fire plan amendment to update the land use planning base. In addition, they are initiating two new Resource Management Plans that will address wildland fire management needs (Ring-of Fire RMP and East Alaska RMP). These two plans however, are not scheduled for completion until the end of FY 2005.
Recommendation: AFS, Field Office Managers, and the State Office should continue efforts to complete the Statewide Fire Plan Amendment by the end of FY 2004.

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21. AFS Document: Organization of the Alaska Fire Service
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25. BLM Memorandum: Alaska Fire Service Reorganization, dated March 4, 1982
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31. Implementation Plan in Response to September 1999 Alaska Fire and Aviation Program Review Recommendations, dated March 10, 2000

32. Bureau of Land Management Smokejumper Review, August 1999
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41. Memorandum of Understanding, Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group (AWFCG), 2001
42. Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group Standard Operating Plan, 2001

INTERVIEWEE ROSTER

January 22, 2003		
Dave Curry	AICC Manager	Alaska Fire Service
Lindsey Lien	AICC Logistics Coordinator	Alaska Fire Service
Mary Lynch	Planning & Env Coordinator	Alaska Fire Service
Harry Bader	Regional Land Director	Alaska DNR
Roselynn Reesa Smith	Fire Planning Coordinator	Alaska DNR
Bob Schneider	Field Manager, No District	Northern Field Office
Susan Will	Associate Field Manager	Northern Field Office
Skip Theisen	FMO	Northern Field Office
Mary Figarelle	Fortymile Team Supervisor	Northern Field Office
Gil Eggleston	State Aviation Manager	Alaska Fire Service
Scott Billing	Manager	Alaska Fire Service
Deb Lipyanic	Natural Resource Supervisor	Ft. Wainwright
Dan Reese	Forester	Ft. Wainwright, Ft. Greeley, Ft. Richardson
January 23, 2003		
Tim Pfahler	Acting Supervisory Pilot	Region 1 - USFS
Joe Ribar	Fire Staff Officer	Alaska Fire Service
Wally Griffin	Chief Pilot	Alaska Fire Service
Ken Coe	FMO	Galena Zone
Veronica Belton	Acting Chief, Div of Fire Services	Alaska Fire Service
Dan Warthin	FMO	NPS-Denali
Larry Weddle	Hazards Fuels Specialist	NPS-Denali
Scott Fisher	Air Ops Manager	Region 6 - USFS
Tommy Oldham	Fire Chief	Ft. Greeley
Barry Whitehill	Deputy Refuge Mgr-Yukon Flats	Fish & Wildlife
Jimmy Fox	Yukon Flats	Fish & Wildlife
Jim Elazer	Southern Region Forester	Alaska DNR
Dean Brown	Assistant State Forester	Alaska DNR
Tawnia Harp	Budget Analyst	Alaska Fire Service
Dave Dash	Chief, Division of Fire Ops	Alaska Fire Service
Dalan Romero	Chief, Smokejumper Ops	Alaska Fire Service
Rex McKnight	Chief, Fire Management Resources	Alaska Fire Service
Gary Lee	FMO	Doyon
Doug Hanson	Forester	Tanana Chiefs Conference
Jim Bell	FMO	Tanana Chiefs Conference
Bob Ott	Joint Fire Science Projects	Tanana Chiefs Conference
Matt Tomter	Aviation Officer	Alaska DNR
Jeff Jahnke	State Forester	Alaska DNR
January 24, 2003		
Tammy DeFries	FMO-Military Zone	Alaska Fire Service
Kato Howard	State Fuels Mgmt Specialist	Alaska Fire Service

Chris Maisch	Northern Regional Forester	Alaska DNR
Pete Buenau	Fire Operations	Alaska DNR
Bev Fronterhouse	Acting Chief, Div of Info Systems	Alaska Fire Service
Tom Kurth	Northern Region FMO	Alaska DNR
Ed Strong	Tanana Zone FMO	Alaska Fire Service
Dave Whitmer	Fuels Mgmt Spec – Tanana Zone	Alaska Fire Service
Mary Lynch	Planning & Environment Coord	Alaska Fire Service
Rick Dupuis	AICC Logistics Coordinator	Alaska DNR
Mike Silva	Upper Yukon Zone FMO	Alaska Fire Service
Bill Beebe	Southern Region FMO	Alaska DNR
Joe Stam	Fire Program Manager	Alaska Div of Forestry
Mary Kwart	FMO-Tetlin NWR	Fish & Wildlife Service

January 27, 2003

Karen Murphy	Fire Ecologist	Fish & Wildlife Service
Gene Long	WUI Specialist	Fish & Wildlife Service
Carol Moore	State Budget Officer	BLM State Office
Mike Lewis	Telecom Specialist	Fish & Wildlife Service
June Baily	Associate Field Manager	Anchorage Field Office
Brian Sterbenz	FMO	Anchorage Field Office
Clint Hansen	Acting Assoc Field Manager	Anchorage Field Office
Vicky Hawkinson	Procurement Analyst	BLM State Office
Susan Ryherd	Grants & Agreements	BLM State Office
Gene Turland	Associate State Director	BLM State Office
Jack Busteed	Human Resource Officer	BLM State Office
Jennifer Allen	Fire Ecologist	National Park Service
Sharon Alden	Predictive Services	National Park Service
Jody Weil	Chief, External Affairs	BLM State Office
John Rego	Fire Coordinator	Glennallen Field Office
Garth Olson	Chief Information Officer	BLM State Office
Doug Newbold	FMO-Kenai NWR	Fish & Wildlife Service
Nolan Heath	DSD-Lands, Minerals & Resources	BLM State Office
Randy Sourhada	Chief, Inspection & Prevention	Ft. Richardson

January 28, 2003

Kelly Kane	FMO	AFS Southern Zone
Chris Hays	Fuels Management Specialist	AFS Southern Zone
Bob Evans	Aviation Specialist	AFS Southern Zone
Sue Rodman	Prevention & Education	Anchorage Fire Department
Michelle Weston York	Forester/Administrative	Anchorage Fire Department
Brad Cella	FMO	National Park Service
Karen LaMay	Fire Program Assistant	National Park Service
Darrell Kaase	Fire Program	AK Village Coun. Presidents

January 29, 2003		
Nate Shourds	FMO	BIA
Charlie Sink	Fire Program	Chugachmiut
John Payne	Wildlife Biologist	BLM State Office
Curtis Wilson	Supervisory Land Use Planner	BLM State Office
Michael Kasterin	Land Use Planner	BLM State Office
Anne Lawton	Air Quality Standards	AK Dept. of Environmental Conservation
Joe Stam	Fire Program Manager	Alaska DNR
Bill Beebe	Regional FMO	Alaska DNR
Wayne Bushnell	Regional Fire Operations	USFS
Mike Stubbs	Chugach FMO	USFS
John Liston	Regional Aviation Officer	USFS
January 30, 2003		
Jeff Jahnke	State Forester	Alaska DNR
Gust Panos	Cadastral Branch Chief	BLM State Office
Terry Hobbs	Cadastral Section Chief	BLM State Office
February 7, 2003:		
Mike Rose	State Safety Officer	BLM State Office
Other Interviews		
Dennis Lamun	Acting Group Manager, Aviation	BLM OF&A
Andy Smith	Chief, Budget and Evaluation	BLM OF&A
Bill Mitchell	Fire Planning Specialist	BLM OF&A
Terry O'Connell	Fire Facilities Lead	BLM OF&A
Grant Beebe	Smokejumper Chief	BLM OF&A

TEAM ROSTER

Sean Cross	Chief, Preparedness/Suppression Standards	BLM OF&A
Doug Alexander	Regional Wildland Fire Specialist	NPS MWRO
Mike Aoi	Assistant Fire Management Officer	BLM USRD
Lyle Carlile	Associate Director, Fire Use and Fuels	BIA NIFC
Ted Milesnick	Chief, Fire Planning & Research	BLM OF&A
Tim Murphy	Bureau Chief, Division of Fire & Aviation	MT DNRC
Pat Norbury	National Fixed Wing Standardization Pilot	USFS WO NIFC
Larry Vanderlinden	Fire Management Coordinator	FWS Region 7
Lynne Willoughby	Program Analyst	BLM OF&A
Kathy Collins	Staff Assistant	BLM OF&A
Rhonda Steinmann	Administrative Assistant	BLM OF&A

Section 3

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BLM FIRE OPS

United States Department of the Interior

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
Alaska State Office
222 W. 7th Avenue, #13
Anchorage, Alaska 99513-7599

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MAY 12 - 2003
BLM - NATIONAL INTER-AGENCY FIRE CENTER

9200 (310)

APR 30 2003

Memorandum

To: Director, Office of Fire and Aviation

From : State Director, Alaska

Subject: Alaska Fire and Aviation Program Review—Response and Implementation Plan

Attached is Alaska's final response and implementation plan for the program review conducted in Alaska on January 21-31, 2003.

We have already made progress towards completion of some findings within the review and expect to have full completion of the implementation plan by the start of the FY2004 fire season except in the area of fire planning. We are currently working with our Field Office Managers to develop a time line for completion of a State-wide amendment by December 31, 2004.

I recommend that future state-wide program reviews for the fire and aviation programs include as team members, a senior Bureau Line Manager and a State Fire Management Officer.

If you have any questions about our response or the implementation plan, please contact Scott Billing, Manager of the Alaska Fire Service. He can be reached at (907) 356-5500.

Kevin R Brown

Attachment
Alaska Final Response and Implementation Plan w/attachments (20 pp)

cc: Fire Ops Group

ALASKA FIRE AND AVIATION PROGRAM REVIEW

JANUARY 21-31, 2003

RESPONSE AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

1. ALASKA FIRE SERVICE (AFS) MISSION

Finding: The Alaska Fire Service (AFS) mission, and the roles and responsibilities of many employees and functions of the AFS, are inadequately defined to provide for sound program management and to ensure effective relationships with users.

Alaska Discussion: A document search has been completed and we agree that there is not one document that clearly identifies the full mission of the Alaska Fire Service; but the information does reside in a series of documents. These documents include the approval memorandum of October 16, 1981; the Alaska Organizational Effectiveness and Efficiency Review (OEER) approved in 1992; AFS Organizational Review approved in 1997; and AFS partial reorganization approved in 2000 and 2002.

The Departmental Manual at 620 DM2 currently reflects the correct suppression mission and responsibilities that have been assigned to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). It would be inappropriate to rewrite this chapter of the DM to reflect the mission and responsibilities of AFS that have been established and delegated by the Alaska State Director.

Implementation of Recommendations: AFS will work to consolidate all the current information into one document and make it available to new Bureau and Interagency personnel in Alaska. Target date of accomplishment is October 1, 2003.

2. AFS ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Finding: AFS organizational development and expansion has not been based on accurately identified and articulated user requirements.

Alaska Discussion: Through the 1980's and 1990's there have been many organizational changes in the Bureau of Land Management in Alaska. Many of the changes have occurred prior to the current members of the Alaska BLM Leadership Team and the historical knowledge and justification for the organization changes has not been carried forward.

The AFS budget does carry support funding from MLR activities. The preliminary budget request for FY2004 expands the request for MLR funds for areas not fully addressed, such as, radio maintenance and aviation management functions.

The Zone Fuels Management positions were proposed in 1995 and implemented upon the approval of an AFS reorganization in 1997. A copy of the reorganization proposal was sent to our cooperators and the Alaska Management Team members for comment on May 19, 1995.

The Hazardous Materials Specialist is funded through the 1640 program. The position serves a positive role within the organization because of all the fueling (potential spills) that occurs in field conditions, transportation of fuels, hazardous materials disposal such as, saw fuel, aviation fuel, pump fuel, retardant, and batteries used in the radio repeater system. We have also demonstrated a need for this position during clean-up of old bases in Bettles, Dahl Creek, and Tanana.

The Safety positions are not only used to monitor the safety of our employees in suppression actions, but also provides safety management and oversight to other program areas such as facilities maintenance, fuels management, aviation etc. The safety position, along with an active collateral duty safety program, monitor the safety of four hundred (400) career and temporary employees along with over one-thousand (1000) emergency fire fighters.

With large fire activity located in extremely remote locations, a Fire Medic program was established to train and ensure that EMT's are available during extended fire situations. Before this program was initiated, suppression funds were expended flying firefighters with minor injuries to town for medical treatment that could be performed in the field by qualified EMT personnel.

The Fire Ecologist position was established to provide the Alaska program a better understanding of fire science and the vegetative resources that BLM manages. With this position, we have established an excellent working relationship with both the Alaska University system and the Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Experiment Station. The position is also working to monitor funded Joint Fire Science Program projects and working with our field office resource specialists coordinating vegetative monitoring related to fire activity in Alaska.

The Planning and Environmental Coordinator position was approved by the Alaska Leadership Team to provide coordination of fire planning at the RMP level and with the Interagency Fire Plan. This position also provides assistance to BLM personnel in the preparation of environmental assessments for fuels projects on BLM and Native lands.

All positions have been approved using the proper guidelines established by the State Director of Alaska.

Implementation of Recommendations: A historical presentation of the AFS organization and current responsibilities will be discussed with the Alaska Leadership Team during the Fall 2003 ALT meeting.

3. ALASKA WILDLAND FIRE COORDINATING GROUP REPRESENTATION

Finding: The BLM would be more effectively served by having someone other than an AFS employee represent its interests on the Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group (AWFCG).

Alaska Discussion: The review identified that there are conflicts of interest with AFS representing the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) at the Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group (AWFCG) coordination meetings. It was difficult to tell from this finding what the specific issues were. The State Director, DSD Resources, and AFS Manager will work with Field Office Managers to determined concerns.

A review of the AWFCG membership shows that all membership representatives are agency fire personnel. There are no Field Office Managers, Refuge Managers, Park Superintendents, or Resource Managers assigned to the group.

Information gathered from other States indicates that in most situations the State FMO is the BLM representative on the Geographic Area Coordinating Board. We believe that Alaska is being consistent with that model and with the guidance found in the Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations 2003 at pages 2-6 and 2-7.

Implementation of Recommendations: Discussion with the Field Office Managers will occur prior to October 1, 2003. We will also discuss this issue with the AWFCG membership to determine if there are similar concerns within the general AWFCG membership.

4. SUPPORT COST SURCHARGES

Finding: The February 1, 2002, FMAP update request for $1,400,000 for support cost charges to reflect the full 10% allowable surcharges by the State Office cannot be validated.

Alaska Discussion: We hope the issue of support cost surcharges will be better defined with National guidance prior to FY2004.

We offer the following narrative of our current program to define the strategy now employed in Alaska.

Up until three years ago, the State Office took dollars (off of the top) to support the direct costs associated with supporting AFS, approximately $300-$350K. The amount was adjusted to $500,000 due to average work month cost increase in the 1998 Fire Management Plan update. This amounted to around 2-3% of Alaska's 2810 budget. In 2000 the State Budget Office announced that effective FY2001, 10% of the base 2810 budget would be used to support direct and indirect costs outside of the fire program. There was agreement that this percentage would include AFS Fixed Costs provided directly by AFS which amount to $650-675k per year.

The 2002 AWP Directives state: "The **direct** and **indirect** costs charged to the Fire Preparedness (Subactivity 2810) will be limited to no more than 10% of the statewide 2810 base funding cost target in FY 2002." Using the numbers supplied in the Program Review, available funding (10% of base funding cost target) is $1,657,000. AFS Fixed Costs were $674,000. This left $1,003,000 available to the State Office. In 2002, the State Office planned $855,000 for the 0777 account (indirect costs). They also allocated in direct 2810 dollars 65 WMs (using the Planned Ave WM cost of $5674, 65 WMs = $369,000) and $15,000 in Ops to state office positions. In total, the State Office planned $1,239,000 in direct and indirect costs for 2810.

This is presented as a demonstration of the way in which the dollars are allocated not as an indictment of the State Office Budget shop. The State Budget Officer is very good at ensuring that the State Office expenses stay within the intended amount. However, in the Program Review no recognition was given to the direct costs incurred at the State Office level. Mention is made of the fact that AFS, as well as Cadastral Survey, has their own Information Technology, Communications, and external affairs offices. No credit is given to AFS for providing administrative, procurement, and training staff which are covered by AFS cost target funding. The real issue is the fact that when the costs incurred by AFS which would normally be shared at the Field Office level in other states is added up it more than accounts for the 10% taken off of

the top by the state office. However, AFS recognizes that there is a need for direct support from some state office personnel such as procurement, personnel, and EEO. This has been the only cause for debate with the state budget office. What does the fire program get for the $855,000 that goes into the 0777 account?

The Program Review recommended to not cover the $503,000 difference taken by ASO ($1,657,000-$674,000=$1,003,000 $1,003,000-$500,000=$503,000). This equates to a loss of 89 WMs, the equivalent of 25 Temporary positions, for AFS in FY 2002.

This loss is compounded by the fact that AFS has never been provided additional funds to cover the Office of Fire and Aviation (OF&A) direction to convert the Short Term WAE workforce to Career Seasonal, resulting in an addition of 125 WMs (one WM for each ST converted) or $709,000 impact to AFS operational budget.

Implementation of Recommendations: We will apply the Bureau strategy for direct and indirect charges to fire program funds in FY2004.

5. BUDGET TRACKING

Finding: AFS budget tracking is inadequate to ensure accurate accounting of fire program expenditures.

Alaska Discussion: The organizational location of the position, the duties assigned, the effective working relationships and lines of communication with and among the M-AFS, SPHECO Manager, and Program Managers, has served the organization to date. This structure is aligned with the State Office organizational structure for budget management and budget analysis and we would like to maintain this structure.

Actual performance of duties in the last 10 months substantiates the workload split identified in the Position Description (70% budget and 30% charge card management) for the budget analyst. It is anticipated that the percentage of charge card management duties will decline as the program is further integrated within the organization. Charge card program management responsibilities including monitoring expenditures, coding (default and actual), and RDE oversight corresponds directly with efficient budget analysis. Dual analysis of MIS and EAGLS reporting tools has provided timely tracking of expenditures and facilitated communication with program managers

AFS determined the location of the Budget Analyst position within the Branch of Administrative Services (AK-328), reporting to the Branch Chief, would best serve the organization with regards to budget and fiscal oversight and analysis. Location of the Budget Analyst position within AK-328 is a logical extension of the Branch's responsibilities, which have included back up (budget duties) to the SPECHO Manager, management of the Northern Field Office 0777 account from 1993-2000, and overall responsibility for payments, accounts and fiscal integrity.

Implementation of Recommendations: We do not feel that we need to make changes in our budget tracking process at this time. We will continue to monitor the process to identify any needs for change in the future.

6. BUDGET RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFS AND THE ALASKA STATE OFFICE

Finding: Budget management procedures used by AFS and the Alaska State Office are inadequate to accurately manage the AFS budget.

Alaska Discussion: AFS will coordinate with the ASO Budget Officer to develop an agenda of issues and concerns for the fuels program and related tracking through NFPORS and MIS (Kato Howard, Lead) and initiate an interactive discussion.

AFS will also work with the Budget Officer to develop an agenda of issues and concerns on the deferred fire maintenance budget and program planning (AK-320 Lead) and initiate an interactive discussion.

Implementation of Recommendations: We will schedule an interactive discussion between the fire program and budget personnel prior to June 1, 2003.

7. AFS FUELS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Finding: AFS roles and responsibilities in fire management activities such as prescribed fire, other fuels treatments, fire planning and other fire uses are not clear on lands for which BLM has land management responsibilities. AFS roles in these areas of fire management responsibilities are also unclear on native corporation lands for which BLM has suppression responsibilities.

Alaska Discussion: AFS is willing to work with the State Office and the Field Offices to better define the fuels management workload. The BLM Field Offices have management of their respective land base. Each Field Office has either an FMO/Fuels Specialist or a collateral duty position identified to fill this role. It has always been clear that the Field Offices are responsible for the fuels program in their respective areas and that their FMO/Fuels Specialist is responsible for developing the fuels program within their Field Office. AFS has, and will continue, to work closely with the Field Offices to provide assistance, technical advice and oversight as requested. This assistance is provided by the Zones or the AK-313 staff depending on the workload. The Zones are responsible to work with the Alaska Native community to assist, as appropriate and as requested, with their fuels management needs. AFS will work to manage their resources so they are available during windows of opportunity for prescribed fire.

The program at AFS is more than a prescribed fire program funded through 2823 and 2824. It is a program that also lends itself to 2810 and being prepared for suppression activities if AFS is to meet the goals of firefighter safety and protection of resource values.

The AFS fuels program starts with the zone fuels specialists who have the following duties:

Positions developed to aid in preplanning for suppression

- Cost –savings realized from inventorying allotments, cabins, inholdings
- Work with cabin owners, villages, allotment holders to modify vegetation at sites
- Responsible for monitoring weather and fuel conditions within the zones

Paid for out of 2810 – except for project-specific 2823 dollars

- Function as assistant/secondary AFMOs when needed
- Vegetation management
- Inventory of resources to be protected
- Assessment of the land base we are protecting
- Monitor fire behavior, growth, and development
- Monitor fire effects both short and long term
- Recommend actions based on fire effects knowledge
- Evaluate fire management option changes
- Hazard assessment
- Risk mitigation

The State Fuels Management Specialist is primarily responsible for program coordination, budgets and data call responses to National Office. The position in other states is normally located at the State Office, but resides at AFS based on the delegated fuels responsibilities to the organization.

Implementation of Recommendations: We will work with the Field Office Managers and our interagency cooperators to develop a strong fuels program in Alaska that addresses the President's forest health initiatives and the initiatives of the National Fire Plan.

8. PRESCRIBED FIRE FOR RESOURCE BENEFITS

Finding: Policy is inadequate regarding use of 2823 program funds to conduct prescribed burns on native corporation lands when the primary objective is for resource management.

Alaska Discussion: To date AFS has not participated with a Native entity to conduct prescribed burns for resource management objectives.

Through Secretarial Order 3077, the BLM was delegated responsibility to provide wildland fire suppression on lands conveyed to Natives under the provisions of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). It is through this delegation that hazard fuels treatments to reduce the wildland fire risk in and adjacent to Native villages has been accomplished. This interpretation of the hazard fuels reduction policy was coordinated with the OF&A on March 10, 2000, and the resultant policy memorandum dated March 28, 2000 was issued. (See Attachment 2)

There does not appear to be direction within ANCSA for the expenditure of federal funds on private lands to enhance resource values or for the expenditure of federal funds to assist Native landowners in achieving resource management objectives with the use of prescribed fire.

AFS plans to work with Native communities interested in achieving resource management objectives. We believe it is our responsibility when asked to provide technical expertise, to

develop a viable plan to achieve the stated goals. AFS will also provide advice on funding resources for the projects once the plan is completed. We feel that there are opportunities for funding under the "Healthy Forests" or through the subsistence program. AFS will initiate conversation through the BLM subsistence coordinator to develop program specifics. If Native entities obtain project funding, it may be possible for AFS to enter into an Agreement with them to help them achieve their goals.

Implementation of Recommendations: AFS will initiate dialogue with the Alaska BLM Subsistence Coordinator to pursue funding for prescribed fire use to benefit resources on native lands. Funding for prescribed fire should come through the subsistence program. The dialogue will be initiated by October 1, 2003.

9. WILDLAND FIRE USE

Finding: The Alaska Interagency Wildland Fire Management Plan (AIWFMP) does not address wildland fire use to sufficiently meet the objectives of the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. The roles and responsibilities of the federal land managers and of the AFS, USFS, and State of Alaska suppression organizations are not adequately defined to manage wildland fires for resource benefits according to established interagency policy.

Alaska Discussion: Wildland Fire Use is the new terminology developed in the last few years as a result of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review and continued in the 2001 Review of the 1995 policy. The goals and intent of Wildland Fire Use are similar to the Limited and Modified (after conversion) Management Options implemented through the 1998 Alaska Interagency Wildland Fire Management Plan (AIWFMP). The Program Review recommends that another layer of paperwork and forms are needed so that the limited fires can be "adequately addressed by national fire reporting databases that truly reflect their intent and distinguish them from unwanted wildland fires." We realize this is a problem and we will/are working with our Interagency partners to resolve this issue.

The following chart compares the language in the 2003 Standards for Fire and Aviation Operation and the AIWFMP.

Wildland Fire Use	
Standards for Fire and Operations: **Chapter 1** Wildland fire will be used to protect, maintain, and enhance resources and, when possible, be allowed to function in its natural ecological role. Use of fire will be based on approved FMPs, and will follow specific prescriptions contained in operational plans.	**AIWFMP** **Guidelines** Wildland fire management decisions and resource management decisions go hand in hand and are based on approved fire management and land and resource management plans. At the same time, agency administrators must have the ability to choose from the full spectrum of fire management actions – from prompt suppression to allowing fire to function in its natural ecological role.

	Limited Management Option; **Intent** The Limited management option may also be chosen for areas where fire occurrence is essential to the biodiversity of the resources protected and the long-term ecological health of the land. **Policy** Wildland fires occurring within this designation will be allowed to burn under the influence of natural forces within predetermined areas while continuing protection of human life and site-specific values within the management option **Modified Management Option:** **Policy** After the conversion date, the default action for all fires occurring within the Modified management option areas will be routine surveillance to ensure that identified values are protected and that adjacent higher priority management areas are not compromised.
Chapter 10 Agencies may apply this strategy in managing wildland fires for resource benefit. An approved Fire Management Plan (FMP) is required. This plan identifies specific resource and fire management objectives, a predefined geographic area, and prescriptive criteria that must be met. A Wildland Fire Implementation Plan (WFIP) will be completed for all wildland fires that are managed for resource benefit. This is an operational plan for assessing, analyzing, and selecting strategies for wildland fire use. It is progressively developed and documents appropriate management responses for any wildland fire managed for resource benefits. The plan will be completed in compliance with the guidance found in the *Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management Policy Implementation Procedures Reference Guide, August 1998*	**Limited Objectives** Within land manager/owner(s) policy constraints, accomplish land and resource management objectives through the use of wildland fire while protecting identified values. Reduce overall suppression costs through minimum resource commitment without compromising firefighter safety. Prevent fires from burning out of the management area to protect human life and identified resources while ensuring that suppression costs and associated environmental impacts of suppression actions are commensurate with the potential damage to values to be protected. Use low impact suppression tools and tactics whenever possible.

Implementation of Recommendations: We will work with our interagency partners to discuss possible changes to the Alaska Interagency Fire Plan prior to May 1, 2004.

10. AFS SUPPORT OF MILITARY FIRE USE

Finding: Natural resource personnel for US Army properties (Ft. Wainwright, Ft. Greeley, and Ft. Richardson) would like the AFS to provide expanded services in wildland fire use and prescribed fire.

Alaska Discussion: The AFS Military Zone has drafted a proposal (See Attachment 3) to dedicate AFS employees to the spring prescription window projects. At present, there are three personnel dedicated to the project with an expectation that we will be able to assign two more personnel to the project by May 15, 2003.

Implementation of Recommendations: Partial implementation will occur during the FY 2003 field season with full implementation during field season FY2004.

11. AFS AND DNR COOPERATION

Finding: The operating agreement between the State of Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the AFS is not adequate to ensure efficient interagency fire management.

Alaska Discussion: We need to make sure the record is correct and identifies exactly what the situation is. Last year, 2002, the annual operating plan was completely signed by July 2, 2002. Although the timing was late, it by no means, could be considered late fall, even by Alaska weather standards.

The Review indicates that there were issues that were still unresolved when the agreement was signed. As far as we can determine, there was one unresolved issue and that was the cost of the State buying into the smokejumper program.

There is a problem communicating the concept that the smokejumpers are a part of the AFS planned initial attack force and that the AFS initial attack planning system is based on fire activity in the AFS protection zone and not on a statewide basis. So when smokejumper availability and/or pre-positioning is discussed, decisions are based on needs identified by AFS Zone FMOs and they are given priority. If AFS Zones do not have a need and AFS Zone FMOs agree to release jumpers for pre-positioning in the State's protection zone, then it is approved. The same strategy is used for AFS air tankers. The State of Alaska also uses the same strategy for their helicopters that are designated for initial attack.

The two BLM air tankers sent to the lower 48 during the 2002 Alaska fire season were at the direction of the National MAC Group. This was discussed in the morning meeting with the participation of the DNR representative. The National MAC Group made this decision based on national priorities, and within their authority to prioritize and direct national resources.

The morning AICC tactical meeting involves much more than just discussing the day's current numbers, locations and prepositioning of tactical resources. Also discussed are the current Alaska fire danger and weather situation, resource availability issues, aviation issues, fuels management activities, the lower 48 fire situation, and mobilization of non-tactical resources, both in-state and outside of Alaska. Essentially, it's a very short, daily morning briefing on the current fire situation and up-to-date information can be gleaned by attending. Attendance has included at least one or more DNR representatives.

Implementation of Recommendations: Discussion of initial attack resources and timing of agreement approval has been discussed with the Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources and the State Director. The FY 2003 operating agreement is in final review stages for approval.

The format of the tactical meeting will be changed for the FY 2003 field season.

12. PROTECTION AREA EXCHANGE BETWEEN DNR AND AFS

Finding: State of Alaska DNR has requested a reevaluation of AFS and DNR protection areas in order to resolve outstanding issues related to protection areas and to improve fire management efficiency.

Alaska Discussion: We are willing to work with the State in considering changes to protection areas. The State of Alaska has agreed to provide a written proposal for exchange by October 1, 2003.

Consideration needs to be given to the budget increase needed should the exchange outlined in the Review be implemented. AFS would have to consider the following cost increases to cover the Federal lands in Southwest Alaska.

(a) Suppression infrastructure in the Southern Zone that would be duty stationed in McGrath.
(b) Fixed wing aircraft contract to monitor fires.
(c) Helicopter to retrieve jumpers.
(d) Possibility of one additional jumpship.
(e) Additional jumpers.
(f) Training of additional Type II crews located within the area of exchange.
(g) RAWS and Radio Communications networks to be established and maintained.

By comparison, the State of Alaska would probably have to increase their number of engines by one to cover the Central area and supplement their helitack organization in Tok and Fairbanks.

Implementation of Recommendations: Once an exchange proposal has been received and agreed upon, an implementation plan will be developed.

13. SMOKEJUMPER OPERATIONS

Finding:

a. The current AFS smokejumper aircraft configuration of four aircraft is adequate for mission requirements. Additional funding is required for one of those aircraft.
b. Current Alaska Fire Service smokejumper headcount is adequate for the mission.

Alaska Discussion: The effective headcount of the Alaska smokejumpers has eroded over time. Prior to 1998, Alaska smokejumpers could reliably count on detailed smokejumpers from the Boise-BLM and Forest Service bases. The details were of long duration and the personnel were able to acquire the Alaska experience necessary to be effective in the operating environment. Since 1998 the Alaska base has been forced to rely on short duration boosts. Boost requests are less reliable, of short duration, and subject to national jumper availability. The end result has been a significant loss of effective headcount and Alaskan expertise.



HISTORY

The Alaska Base split in August 1986 at which time the Boise Base was opened. BLM Smokejumper Operations Plans up through 1990 specified that "a minimum of one half of the Great Basin Smokejumpers will be available to Alaska." Since then the number of Boise jumpers available to Alaska have decreased to the point that during the initial boost, they have only been able to provide 8 to 16 jumpers. This is primarily due to their increased use in the Great Basin. The benefit of Boise providing smokejumpers to Alaska were that they had Alaska fire experience and jumped ram-air parachutes. Alaska has not received Boise smokejumpers in the numbers requested for a number of years. In addition, rookie training for both BLM bases was done in Alaska for two primary reasons, 1) Provide a core of Boise jumpers for the Alaska fire season. 2) Keep BLM jumpers current in Alaska fire experience.

- Boise doesn't have the Alaska fire experience they used to have. Many of their personnel haven't trained in Alaska (Forest Service transfers) and since 2001 Boise has trained their own rookies.
- Forest Service boosters now have a comparable amount of Alaska experience however, they jump round parachutes. This presents a problem of inability to drop due to high

winds commonly encountered in Alaska. One reason for developing the ram-air parachute in Alaska was the frequency of windy jumps.

CURRENT REALITY

- As Alaska has increased the amount of land in Limited Management, there has been a corresponding increase in the number of cabins and allotments surrounded by limited rather than residing in full protection areas. More and more, the response required in these situations is other than straight forward initial attack suppression. Cabin and allotment protection requires Alaska experience due to the unique nature of these actions in Alaska fuel types. Currently a majority of Alaska rookies come from Alaska Hot Shot crews and have a solid base of Alaska fire experience.
- Cabin and allotment protection often requires more smokejumpers than initial attack. Rather than fewer jumpers on one small fire, there are typically many more smokejumpers involved in protecting multiple cabins and allotments. Often, multiple loads of smokejumpers are required.
- Our FMAP covers AFS protection responsibility lands. Smokejumpers cover not only that Federal country but also the State of Alaska protection area. In many areas (southwest Alaska for instance) smokejumpers are the only resource the State has to quickly cover these long distances. Smokejumper use by the State cuts into the number available to AFS by one or two loads for a large part of the fire season.
- It now requires more smokejumpers to maintain the same level of response. Three out of four jump ships require two spotters rather than one. The 2:1 work/rest ratio and mandatory day off cut into availability. It may require dropping extra jumpers in order to meet work shifts and 2:1 work/rest ratios.
- Alaska Smokejumpers provide individuals to overhead teams and the air attack program which in turn decreases the available number as smokejumpers.

LOWER 48 AVAILABILITY

- Boise does not/cannot provide jumpers in the numbers required due to their increased use in the Great Basin and personnel on detail assignments.
- USFS Bases are heavily involved in both refresher and rookie training while the early part of the Alaska season occurs. Their rookie training doesn't start until late May/early June nor finish until the third or fourth week of June.
- Many of their overhead are tied up in rookie training so are unable to provide spotters to Alaska in the numbers required to staff all the jump ships for mixed load operations.
- The USFS provides smokejumpers to Region 3 which coincides with the Alaska fire season, thereby reducing the number available to Alaska.
- Typically the USFS fire season has not started so USFS bases have not yet brought on all their personnel and are not at full strength and won't be until mid to late June.

We are in compliance with the recommendations offered for this review item.

Smokejumpers coming into Alaska do get briefed on Alaska tactics along with weather and fire condition.

We also strive to intermix experienced jumpers with less experienced jumpers; but the best training is still on-the-job training.

For the reasons we have listed above, we must respectfully disagree with the team's assessment of headcount needs in Alaska to maintain a quality, experienced smokejumper pool to carry out the mission.

Implementation of Recommendations: We will continue to refine our workload analysis and document possible need for an increased headcount of Alaska smokejumpers.

14. AERIAL SUPERVISION MODULE (ASM)

Finding: Necessity of basing an ASM module in Alaska has not been adequately established.

Alaska Discussion: Although there are varying opinions as to what level of aerial supervision is needed in Alaska, we still have a viable agreement with DOF to provide for one platform.

A solution to this issue is to develop a shared aircraft/pilot agreement with another state such as Montana/Colorado. We can still maintain a strong participation in our interagency program and reduce the costs of another contract. This plan was suggested to National Aviation Office early in the Fall of 2002. and again during the Review process without any response.

It was made clear at the fall ASM meeting that without Alaska's ATGS program the rest of BLM's ASM program is very short staffed. AFS cannot maintain the ATGS positions in an ASM Module without a fully functional platform.

Implementation of Recommendations: We will continue to review and evaluate the risk of not having lead plane capability with our aerial supervision program.

15. PILOTS

Finding: AFS has more pilots than its mission can justify.

Alaska Discussion: There needs to be some historical background on this issue for the record. The National Office should consider that they have been a part of this pilot program all along. When AFS planned to hire several new pilots in 1999 for both ASM and Sherpa program, it was due to the majority of the pilots moving on. During this process, the National Office not only supported the agency pilot concept, but participated in the selection through the involvement of Rusty Warbis. Less than a year later, by mutual agreement with the National Office, the Alaska Fire Service requested that the Sherpa aircraft program be discontinued.

The National Aviation Office was asked to assist and/or take the lead in the development of our USFS/BLM aircraft and pilot exchange agreement. The Aviation Group Manager was not interested in participating in this agreement or having input. He was informed of the specifics including a copy of the final document.

Our ASM training program has been under the direction of Rusty Warbis throughout both pilot trainee periods and we followed his direction and the NAO program guidelines to manage their training.

Implementation of Recommendations: We agree the National office should be involved with aircraft exchange agreements and pilot development programs.

16. LAND USE PLANNING

Finding: BLM land use plans do not provide adequate direction for wildland fire management.

Alaska Discussion: A statewide land use plan amendment proposal is being developed in order to meet the 2004 deadline as directed by the National Office.

Alaska has a 10-year planning schedule for updating and developing RMPs for all BLM lands to meet the guidelines outlined in the Land Use Planning Handbook. Two of those planning efforts are underway: East Alaska and Ring of Fire.

The BLM RMPs may not be in compliance with the Federal Fire Policy; however, the 1998 Alaska Interagency Wildland Fire Management Plan (AIWFMP) is in compliance. The AIWFMP ensures that "wildland fire is integrated with resource goals and objectives" and also "that wildland fire plays its role as a natural ecological process." The AIWFMP supports the annual review and update of management option designations by all land managers to assure that each and every land manager has to ability to incorporate current agency policy and resource objectives. The Alaska Wildland Fire Coordination Group oversees the AIWFMP and has parameters and procedures in place for those updates.

The same processes used to develop land use plans were used to develop the original fire management plans in the 1980s. Those plans were developed through the collaborative efforts of interagency interdisciplinary teams and applied on an interagency, multi-jurisdictional, landscape scale basis. Public meetings were held throughout the State. Native groups were included in the planning effort. Those plans were combined in 1998 to complete the planning effort in a document to serve as a single reference for operational decisions.

Implementation of Recommendations: We are working towards completion of a Statewide Land Use Plan amendment by December 30, 2004.

3 Attachments

1 – AFS Organizational Development (2 pp)
2 – Coordinated Fuels Activities in Alaska Memo (1 p)
3 – Fuels Module Spring 2003 (2 pp)

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To Scott Billing	From Gardner Ferry
Co.	Co.
Dept. AFS Director	Phone #
Fax #	Fax #

Memorandum

To: State Director, Alaska

From: Director, Office of Fire and Aviatic

Subject: Coordinated Fuels Activities in Alaska

On March 10, Scott Billing met in Boise with Gardner Ferry, Ron Dunton, and Al Carriere from my staff, and with Steve Haglund, Jim Stiers, and Lyle Carlile of the BIA's national office fire staff. The topic was the potential for fuels management activities in Alaska on Indian Allotments, Native Village lands, and Native Corporation lands.

It was agreed that the BIA had responsibility for allotments, and BLM, through their fire protection responsibilities, has a role with village lands. It was further agreed that before any treatments were initiated, BLM (AFS) and BIA (Regional Office, Juneau) would coordinate on a process to identify the workload. The concepts contained in the fuels portion of the Risk Assessment and Mitigation Strategies (RAMS) process should be applied. Treatments should be identified on risk, values, and physical science and not driven by socio-political factors. Effort should be made to prioritize projects where individual economically justified treatments will connect allotments and or villages in a logical manner, creating defensible and maintainable boundaries.

Funding for treatments from the Interior Hazardous Fuel Reduction Operations subactivity will be available when an assessment process has been established, and a coordinated analysis has been completed to identify priority areas and projects. The workload analysis should consider an incremental approach to attaining a sustainable workload. Funding is not unlimited, therefore coordination with national offices (BLM and BIA) must occur and be balanced with the other potential fuels treatment projects occurring on public lands in Alaska and across the country. It is advisable to coordinate activities with the other Department of the Interior agencies managing lands in interior Alaska that also face substantial risk from fire or from the exclusion of fire.

Please keep this office informed of your progress, and do not hesitate to ask for assistance in this sizable undertaking. If you have any questions, please contact Ron Dunton, 208-387-5446, or Gardner Ferry, 208-387-5161.

/s/ Ron Dunton
Acting

cc:
BIA, Director of Fire Management (NIFC)

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Fuels Module Spring 2003

Fire management is a hot topic in the national perspective. Recent policy changes on the national level have indicated that the fire community direct and expand its mission to encourage prescribe fire and other fuels manipulation techniques. National campaigns such as the Forest Health Initiative and National Fire Plan directives imply focus in prescribe fire and hazardous fuels reduction.

At the request of the Army, the Alaska Fire Service Military zone has offered to coordinate a hazard fuel reduction program on Army lands. Examples of the type of project commitments include: broadcast burns on Small Arms Ranges, aerial drop zones, and habitat enhancement units, thinning and pile burning around structures and adjacent high values, and mechanical treatments followed by pile burning on large tracts of land.
This list is ever growing especially in light of the recently enhanced Military mission in our country.

Alaska Fire Service has this fire expertise to get the job done. It is our pool of experience that is needed to accomplish some of the projects that have been envisioned for the past few years. The Alaska fire program is just emerging into prescribed fire. And all it needs is a few dedicated highly motivated fire people to get it off the ground. The time is now.

Primary Mission:

The proposed BLM, Alaska Fire Service Prescribe Fire Module would consist of approximately 4-6 personnel. The personnel would be drawn from all branches of Alaska Fire Service with possible expansion into an interagency cooperation (Military and State personnel). The targeted projects would primarily reside in the Alaska Fire Service Military Zone proposed prescribe fire projects but may also include fire use fires, project development, site preparation, project implementation, and monitoring.

Project Benefits:

*Implement and complete numerous fuels projects of AFS
*Enhance the Alaska rx program
*Increase personal awareness and training in the field of fuels / prescribe fire
*Contribute to National Fire Policy directives in the field of fuels and prescribe fire.

Personnel:

Module would consist of 4 - 6 fully qualified individuals to implement prescribe fire as well as hazard fuels reduction projects. Supervision would fall under the FMO and Fuels Management Specialist Alaska Fire Service Military Zone. Module leader will work closely with the National Weather Service, AICC, and Military Zone FMO to capture open prescribe fire windows throughout the state and designate project priority when needed. Due to the short prescribe fire window in Alaska the prescribe fire module must remain flexible to capture every opportunity that arises, work weekends, monitor weather patterns, resource requests, equipment needs, etc to allow completion of numerous projects.

Funding:

Module would consist of 4-6 qualified individuals to develop, implement, and monitor specific projects within the time allotment (3 week commitment). Individual project charge code(s) will cover overtime and burn activities conducted by module. Travel / Transportation (project to project) will come out of 2830 reimbursable fund. Module leader will be responsible for management of appropriated project and program funding.

Timeline:

Three-week commitment to the Military Zone AFS. (End of April – Mid-May). Exact dates will not be finalized until April 7, All proposed prescribe fire projects will follow will be accordance national and state regulations.

Potential Projects

Prescribe Fire

Project	Location	size (approx)
1) Malemute Drop Zone	Ft. Richardson	400 ac
2) Small Arms Range	Ft. Wainwright	1200 ac
3) Texas Range	Ft. Greely	3700 ac
4) Husky Drop Zone	Eielson AFB	200 ac
5) Grouse Habitat	Eielson AFB	5 ac
6) Ammo Bunker	Ft. Wainwright	2 ac

Hazard Fuels Reduction Projects:

Project	Activity
1) East Donnelly Range Expansion	Flag unit, chainsaw activity
2) Beetle Traps	installation and trap clean up
3) WUI projects	Ft. Richardson- misc. activities
4) Manchu	misc. preparation

Development Stage Projects:

Project	Activity
1) Oklahoma Range	rx initial assessment
2) East Donnelly Mitigation and Prevention Plan	build framework for document

	FY03 MLR WMs Funded	FY04 MLR WMs Requested
ka Interagency Coordination Center (AICC) (AK-311) ides aircraft acquisition to NPRA and other resource projects	0	2
tion Office (AK-312) ides Aviation Training to BLM Alaska Aviation Users. (3 wm) ages the Resource Helicopter Manager program through copter Managers dedicated to the various field offices. (3 wm)	0	6
ty, Planning, Environmental & Health Office (AK-313) ides Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste coordination, inspection echnical advise and expertise for AFS and NFO. (1 PFT + Supv)	11	11
hern Fire Management Staff (AK-314) ides services to the AFO and SO that include: t requests, aircraft acquisition, flight following, and aircraft ents. (Dispatchers) (6.5wm) Unit Aviation Officer provides oversight e Campbell Tract runway and helipads, maintenance of aviation y equipment, training, field safety reviews of remote s, and monitors and communicates compliance with agency policy. (6 wm)	0	12.5
sion of Support Services (AK-320) **Shop:** ides fueling services, to include establishment, tenance, service and breakdown of remote fuel sites. ort to NFO comprises 30% of workload with NFO ices routinely requested outside of normal fire season.	1	11
ch of Facility Operations (AK-321) ides general maintenance of NFO administrative sites, tes Barracks facilities that are available to NFO. % MLR funded; less one CS position for Zones in 2810)	107	125

	FY03 MLR WMs Funded	FY04 MLR WMs Request
ch of Supply (AK-322) des support for receiving, inventory and disposal of property (3 wm); annual fire extinguisher inspections, winter storage, Warehouse equipment/supply issue, aster operations (5 wm).	4	8
l Engine Shop: des maintenance and repair of NFO equipment, snow machines, , miscellaneous field project support. Γ)	6	10
sportation: des services related to vehicle maintenance, mileage reports, nt reporting, ATV and defensive driver training, ry to resource project sites. (3 wm)	0	3
:h of Training (AK-326) des training coordination support. (1 PFT @ 10% = 1 wm)	0	1
:h of Administrative Services (AK-328) des aircraft payments processing (4 wm); OWCP services, id employee claims processing (4 wm); procurement services for sition, lease management, and assistance agreements (10 wm), ship and expertise in incident business management (time and lance, travel, etc.).	16	18
l MLR for AFS	**145**	**207.5**

Section 4

mroos

Microsoft Word - SOA Balance of Workload Draft Document

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MEMORANDUM

STATE OF ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AFS Building, State of Alaska Office, 1541 Gaffney,

DIVISION OF FORESTRY – FIRE OPERATIONS
Ft. Wainwright, AK 99703-0005

To: AFS

Date: December 8, 2006

From: Tom Kurth, Fire Operations
for the State of Alaska Working Group
Phone: (907) 356-5850
E-Mail: tom_kurth@dnr.state.ak.us
Fax: (907) 356-5855

Subject: Balancing Workload
Initial Draft Overview

File:

Balance of Preparedness Workload, an Interagency Review

An interagency committee has been formed to examine the issues affecting the primary suppression responsibilities and acres protected. They are to investigate the background evolution of the issue and report to their respective agencies. They Alaska Fire Service has members; Chip Houde, Mike Lambright, Lindsey Lien, and Kelly Kane. The Division of Forestry representatives consists of Tom Kurth, John See, Dennis Ricker, Ric Plate, and Ray Kraemer.

The assumptions made in the original fire protection agreement and with the current fire protection boundaries are no longer valid. Changes made in the agreements, operational considerations, fire management options, etc., have resulted in inefficiencies in the two Agencies.

The questions to be evaluated are; "How do we best provide the most efficient service to our combined customer base," and, "How do we ensure we send the best resource to every fire?"

Prior to examining this issue, administrators from the Alaska Fire Service and the State of Alaska's Division of Forestry have agreed on the following:

1. We are service providers.
2. There maybe a more efficient way of providing this service than the status quo.
3. We should each provide the initial attack system that we do best, e.g., A.F.S. provides remote and long range capabilities and D.O.F. services the road net.
4. We need to identify areas where duplication exists.
5. We would like to make Alaska a model of interagency cooperation.
6. There are resource limitations and budgetary constraints.
7. Capability should meet the need, i.e., use resources where it makes sense to use that resource.
8. We need a common vision for providing service in the future.
9. We need to provide information in both directions within the chain of command for the need for change.
10. Assumptions made in drawing the original and existing fire protection boundaries are no longer valid.

The committee is tasked with determining:

1. What acres warrant preparedness expenses versus, that is, what are considered burnable acres?
2. How has fire management changed since the early "80s?
3. If we balance acres, do we balance efficiencies?
4. Can we erase all lines and redraw alternatives?
5. How does crew management fit into the alternatives?
6. How do we best protect the "high value" land?
7. What organizational alternatives may be possible?
8. How will the organizations be affected monetarily?

Products to aide in this analysis should include (maps):

1. Current protection options and suppression agency responsibilities.
2. Ownership, specifically federal versus state protected.
3. Protection options and ownership.
4. Fire Prone acres, i.e., possible consideration such factors as acres <3500', excluding North Slope and Alaska Peninsula, etc.

Historical documents:

1. Alaska Interagency Fire Management Plan Map
2. Alaska Fire History Map – (needs to be updated to include all DOF fires within the specified time period)
3. Fire Protection Boundary Map for Alaska
4. Fire Weather Data – WIMS archived records (Fire-Family Plus)

Assumptions:

1. Wildland Fire Management Agencies in Alaska have developed specialized skills and expertise in certain areas, i.e., DOF in roadside engine operations and helitack and AFS in remote firefighting (smokejumpers and paracargo, for example).
2. Current facilities (locations, condition and age) were not deemed to be limiting factors on developing new strategies and alternatives for this project.
3. It is the assumption of the State of Alaska that their protection responsibilities would be relegated to the 105 million acres of state, private, and municipal lands granted in statehood.

State of Alaska Balance of Workload Background

A Defined Area:

The basis for the current division of fire protection responsibilities between the State of Alaska and the federal government is the *Reciprocal Fire Protection Agreement between the BLM and the State of Alaska of Alaska.* It now states:

1. The AFS and the DOF agree that wildland fire protection services are best managed by designating defined areas where suppression activities are provided by a single protection agency on State and Federal Lands regardless of ownership.

2. The AFS-DOF boundary is delineated on the attached 1:6,500,000 scale map. Map atlases at the 1:250,000 scale will be maintained at AICC. The AFS Zone and DOF Area Offices will maintain the AFS-DOF boundary on their 1:63,360 scale map atlases.

There is no discussion in the agreement that provides the basis for the "designation of the defined area". There is a general assumption among state and federal fire managers that this designation is based on some equity in protection of each others statutorily or otherwise mandated protection lands. There was an assumption in the 1982 paper written by then State Director Ted Smith, titled *Position Paper on the Direction of the Fire Program,* that the state would **ultimately be responsible to providing fire protection on 105 million acres**, that is, the number of acres the state will eventually be granted title. In other words, the federal government would protect about the same amount of state responsibility land that the state would protect federal responsibility lands. A comparison of this protection responsibility is based on the following information:

	Critical	Full	Modified	Limited	Unplanned	Unknown	Total
State Protects Federal/Native Land:	506,174	28,090,968	19,312,829	40,345,560	2,319,772		90,575,303
AFS Protects State Land:	15,933	1,316,073	24,711,571	5,015,543	62		31,059,182
State Protects Federal Native Critical & Full:							28,597,142
AFS Protects State Critical & Full:							1,332,006
State Protects State Land:	1,102,581	10,845,269	8,544,821	39,772,560	378,528		60,643,759
AFS Protects Federal/Native Land:	661,418	16,337,852	22,402,296	118,666,660	1,870,484	36,400	159,975,110

Total State Protection:	151,219,062
Total AFS Protection:	191,034,292

*This information was developed by the Alaska Fire Services Geographic Information System database shows the following acreage breakdown.

If the assumption is that a parity of acres protected is the basis of designating the defined area for each agencies protection, then the State is providing three times as much protection on federal responsibility land than the AFS is providing protection on state responsibility land. (AFS protects 31.1 million acres of state responsibility land compared to the state protecting 91.6 million acres of federal and native land). When you account for fire protection categories, the State is providing for protection on 29.6 million acres of federal responsibility land in Critical and Full while the federal government provides protection on only 1.3 million acres of state responsibility lands in Critical and Full. This represents **an almost 30 to 1 disparity**.

An issue paper written circa 1982 (from then DOF Director, Ted Smith) provides some history of the respective roles of the State and AFS in the wildland fire protection program. It gives an update to the situation as it existed in 1982, and "recommends a course for the future". This paper describes the history of land acquisition by the state and native corporations and the effect of that transfer on each agencies protection responsibilities. Since land transfers happened at a rate faster than the state was able to develop their own protection program, from 1973 (when the state first took protection for about 187,000acres of land near Haines) through the early 1980's, **the state paid the BLM to provide fire protection services on some of their lands**. As the state suppression capability grew and areas were added to state protection, there arrived a point where the final make-up of the state and federal fire organizations had to be identified. The paper states: "It has been mutually agreed the most efficient state-wide protection program would be to divide the state into two zones with one agency responsible for protection of all lands in each zone. This would minimize duplication of capital improvements and attack organizations by BLM and the state". There also appears to have been a consensus at that time that preparedness costs would be offset, and that no up front money would be exchanged for one agency to protect the other agencies land. This protection responsibility assignment was generated in 1982, which was prior to the implementation of the Alaska Interagency Fire Management Plans. Since this plan identifies a range of protection levels, it is logical that there would be a range of associated costs to providing these varying levels of protection. Land identified as Critical and Full require a higher level of protection, at a higher preparedness cost, than providing a lower level of protection to land is the Limited and Modified categories.

What are we trying to balance? It is clear from the 1982 white paper that the original intent was to balance work load, as expressed through preparedness (preparedness) expenditures. The assumptions on which land "warrant preparedness expenditures" are not clearly stated, but it is likely that any analysis done in 1982 would need updating relative to both fire plan implementation and changes in fire occurrence.

The reasons for not having each agency protect its own responsibility lands are same as they were in 1982. Intermingled land ownership patterns and the remote nature of much of the protection responsibilities make this the least desirable alternative.

The intent of the agreement reached in 1982 was to eliminate the preparedness charge paid by one agency to the other. Prior to that time, however, the State routinely paid the BLM a preparedness charge for the net difference in trade off acres. The idea of the BLM paying the preparedness cost for the current 59.5 million acres of federal land that the State protects after trade off is a viable consideration. If there is an assumption that only critical and full lands

warrant preparedness expenses, there is still a net difference of 27.3 million acres. Using the 1982 figure of $.06/acre, BLM preparedness costs owed to the state would be $3.5 million or $1.6 million per year, respectively. Obviously an analysis of 2005 preparedness costs would need to be conducted to determine per acre cost of this activity, but it is logical to assume that inflation alone would account for a significant increase over the 6 cents per acre figure.

State of Alaska Proposed Alternatives:

1. No Change – Continue Working Under the Imbalance of Both Acres Protected and Workload

2. Give Responsibility for the SW District Back To AFS

3. Establish a New Protection Boundary at 61° (Or 60°) Degrees N Latitude – AFS would assume responsibility for the McGrath Facility and protection responsibility for lands north of 60°. KKAO Would Provide Protection for the Remainder of the SWD (see attached map)

4. Establish an Interagency Office in McGrath to Serve the SWD – AFS Would Commit to Developing Infrastructure

5. Bill AFS for Preparedness Costs.

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Balance of Preparedness Workload, Initial Committee Report

On January 11, 2007, the interagency committee met to examine the issues affecting the preparedness workload between the two agencies. The Alaska Fire Service representatives were; Chip Houde, Mike Lambright, and Lindsey Lien (Kelly Kane, absent). The Division of Forestry representatives consists of Tom Kurth, John See, and Dennis Ricker (Ric Plate and Ray Kraemer, absent).

The original fire protection agreement and the current fire protection boundaries are no longer valid. Changes made in the agreements, operational considerations, fire management options, etc., have resulted in inefficiencies in the two Agencies.

The questions that were evaluated include:

1. How do we best provide the most efficient service to our combined customer base?
2. How do we ensure we send the best resource to every fire?
3. Are there inequities regarding the preparedness load?

Historical context:

The historical context of how we have arrived at where we are today is somewhat ambiguous. An internal state of Alaska document titled, "Position Paper on Direction of Fire Program" from the director of the Division of Forestry Ted Smith to DNR commissioner John Katz outlined some of this history. In it, Director Ted Smith, outlines the need to "meet the job of providing fire protection on 105 million acres," the amount of land granted the state as a result of statehood. After statehood and prior to 1985, as the state was developing a wildland fire program, the state compensated the BLM for fire suppression efforts. After 1985; as fire protection boundaries became more apparent; and to resolve the problem of providing protection to co-mingled lands; the state and AFS agreed to a generalized concept of dividing the state for protection purposes. In general, the state would protect the south half of the state (the road net and populated areas), while AFS would protect the north half (generally remote and air access). With that, it appeared that the state would protect about 145 million acres (65% of the workload), while AFS would protect 105 million acres (35%) of the workload. It was also assumed that AFS would have the majority of lightning caused fires which were assumed to be more expensive to suppress.

Since then, there have been numerous changes to fire protection management options within the protection boundaries, significant urban interface growth, and reductions in suppression resources. It was anticipated that the Fire Program Analysis (FPA) would give us an unbiased look at workload and resource delivery system; however, this information may not be available for some time.

Results of the discussions:

- The committee concluded that despite the numerous attempts at "thinking outside the box," there are no significant revelations that do not include discussion of the mitigation of the imbalance of protection acres within the Southwest Area (McGrath).

- It appears that "State Protection of Federal Lands" is balanced with the "Federal Protection of State Lands", if the Southwest Area is excluded from the discussion.

- The Southwest Area encompasses approximately 68 million acres and contains large tracts of Federal, State, and Native lands.

Conclusions reached by the committee included:

- The transfer of fire protection responsibility for the Southwest Area from the State of Alaska to the Alaska Fire Service would not mitigate the current imbalance. It would only serve to shift the imbalance from the State to the Federal Government.

- It appears that there is an opportunity for an "Interagency Approach" within the Southwest Area. Preparedness workload could be co-managed by both agencies.

- There is a need to include investment in the McGrath facilities. Currently, a majority of the buildings are owned by the federal government and are in a state of disrepair. State procurement rules prohibit an investment of state funds without title. A Capital Improvement Plan and commitment of funds by the Federal government is essential to maintaining the viability of this facility. Committee members agree that this facility and location is of strategic importance in providing fire protection for the public residing in this part of Alaska. It would also be beneficial to include a training facility for village crews from this region of the State.

- An interagency resolution for the 2007 fire season could include the support of personnel from the Anchorage AFS office. This could be in the form of Assistant Fire Management Officer.

- Support effort for the warehouse and logistics should be examined for interagency potential. This also includes the tanker base and runway.

- The state of Alaska is in need of an offset of services for protection of high value areas in the form of smoke jumper availability throughout the state.

- The result of any agreements between the State of Alaska and the Alaska Fire Service regarding the mitigation of the acreage imbalance and the commitment of each agency to an "interagency approach" to the management of the Southwest Area must be included in the SOA/AFS Annual Operating Plan.

Other questions posed for the committee at the Fall Fire Review:

1. *What acres warrant preparedness expenses versus, that is, what are considered burnable acres?*

   Burnable acres were not a discussion point as, in the Southwest Area; all land managers expect some level of service for fire management.

2. *How has fire management changed since the early "80s?*

   The focus has shifted to emphasis on fire management plans. Delivering resources to the high valued lands (critical, full) to protect values at risk is now our emphasis. Currently the state is protecting 28X the number of federal/native lands in critical and full as opposed to the number of acres protected by the federal government of state land in critical and full.

3. *If we balance acres, do we balance efficiencies?*

   Not necessarily, the protection of resources within high valued areas (critical, full) remains the emphasis.

4. *Can we erase all lines and redraw alternatives?*
   There should be an easier alternative since the inception of the Alaska Interagency Fire Management Plan, fire suppression and management has been more efficient.

5. *How does crew management fit into the alternatives?*

   Crew management has a significant role as there are fourteen Type 2 crews in the SW Area. BIA should be consulted for additional input.

6. *How do we best protect the "high value" land?*

   By focusing and delivering the right resources at the critical and full protection areas.

7. *What organizational alternatives may be possible?*

   The short term solution will include support and a presence from the AFS Southern Zone office for fire management support. An additional presence in the form of warehouse and support positions should be negotiated.

8. *How will the organizations be affected monetarily?*

   All solutions have significant ramifications. Total restructuring for either organization does not appear feasible in the near future due to budget restraints.

Prior to examining this issue at the Interagency Fall Fire Review, administrators from the Alaska Fire Service and the State of Alaska's Division of Forestry agreed on the following:

1. We are service providers.
2. There maybe a more efficient way of providing this service than the status quo.
3. We should each provide the initial attack system that we do best, e.g., A.F.S. provides remote and long range capabilities and D.O.F. services the road net.
4. We need to identify areas where duplication exists.
5. We would like to make Alaska a model of interagency cooperation.
6. There are resource limitations and budgetary constraints.
7. Capability should meet the need, i.e., use resources where it makes sense to use that resource.
8. We need a common vision for providing service in the future.
9. We need to provide information in both directions within the chain of command for the need for change.
10. Assumptions made in drawing the original and existing fire protection boundaries are no longer valid.

	Critical	Full	Modified	Limited	Unplanned	Unknown	Total
State Protects Federal/Native Land:	506,174	28,090,968	19,312,829	40,345,560	2,319,772		90,575,303
AFS Protects State Land:	15,933	1,316,073	24,711,571	5,015,543	62		31,059,182
State Protects Federal Native Critical & Full:							28,597,142
AFS Protects State Critical & Full:							1,332,006
State Protects State Land:	1,102,581	10,845,269	8,544,821	39,772,560	378,528		60,643,759
AFS Protects Federal/Native Land:	661,418	16,337,852	22,402,296	118,666,660	1,870,484	36,400	159,975,110
Total State Protection:	151,219,062						
Total AFS Protection:	191,034,292						





Critical Protection Area Comparison



Full Protection Area Comparison



Modified Protection Area Comparison



Limited Protection Area Comparison



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Section 5

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2009
State of Alaska Division of Forestry During Action Review Report
DOF Unit Level Recommendations

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
F 01 ruitment and :ntion of Fire gram workforce F #1 #`1	Salary Study	This is the foundation of any fire program and the underlying issue for many issues. Dependence of emergency hires with EFF receiving higher wage than regular state employees. Significant turnover in entry level firefighter positions No return on investment of training and experience for program retention and depth. DOF has found funding to upgrade equipment such as helicopters, airtankers and engines, but has not kept pace with funding positions to utilize these tools.			
F 02 eline fire program fing F #2 #2	Initiate a Fire Program Review and Workforce Analysis. Consolidation of some Area Office and Dispatch responsibility: Tok and Delta Area Copper River and Mat-Su* Convert positions within new Areas to more effective roles as they become available by attrition. *Move Copper River back into Coastal Region	Area Suppression staffing is inadequate in many cases. What are the current staffing levels based on? During extended periods of fire danger over 50% of the initial attack force is emergency hire versus agency employee. By comparison, the Alaska Fire Service hires only incidental EFF to augment initial attack			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
03 Training #3 3	Develop and deliver statewide GIS training for DOF Dispatch offices. Investigate potential AFS support for training and use of ARCGIS products they have already developed for dispatch	There is a need to develop fundamental skills in most Area Dispatch offices.			
04 of rammatic inuity between ns and areas # 04 04	The Chief of Fire and Aviation and the Fire Operations Forester should develop and publish statewide fire program standards and ensure programmatic continuity. In order to accomplish this, the Chief of Fire will need line authority over Areas. See DOF 05 below. Emphasis on Academy Style training versus traditional S- courses. Ensure fundamental skills are developed in employees. Wildland Firefighter Academy Wildland Engine Academy Helitack Academy ICT4 Academy ICT 3 Academy Develop Individual Development Plans (IDP) and Individual Training Plans (ITP) for all employees involved in fire management from the Central Office to the Area Office Recommend using federal Interagency Fire Program Management (IFPM) Standards as a training and experience goal for identified positions relevant to DOF organization.	Traditional fire training and the 310-1 are focused around Incident Management Teams and Expanded Dispatch Operations. Historically, very little of total training delivered has been devoted to skill sets required to accomplish the primary duty of initial attack. The Coastal Region has four standing crews. Pioneer Peak, Gannet Glacier, Yukon, and Denali, while Northern Region has none. Area Helitack lacks continuity. DOF does not have a statewide helitack program; each DOF Area has its own program with varied success. Engine academy information has not been successfully transferred to all Areas (weighing engines). There is no mechanism to ensure academy standards are achieved. Consolidation of helitack into regional groups with positions transferred from areas as they become vacant for consistent staffing and more effective training and standardization. Investigate RADS Fast Rope System to allow immediate access to every fire and decrease dependence on smokejumpers.			
05	Reorganization of Central Office and	Lack of programmatic control leads to lack of			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
k of line authority Chief of Fire F #05 #05	Regional Office roles and responsibilities for fire management to enable direct line authority for the Chief of Fire over all DOF firefighters. Chief of Fire converted to Division Operations Manager (Fire) Range 24 (class code PA0113) with line authority over Regional Foresters and consequently all areas and all fire personnel Status Quo Chief position. Remove Regions from the fire program. All Areas would report directly to Chief of Fire. Regional FMO positions converted to new positions that report to Chief of Fire or Fire Operations Forester depending on organization adopted	program continuity.			
F 06 F Area fication onsibilities to l managers F#06 #06	Ensure that all Area Foresters/FMOs are aware of, and comply with suppression organization responsibilities in the AIWFMP	Clearly stated in AIWFMP yet compliance is sporadic across DOF.			
F 07 S/DOF P Review F#07 ‡ 07	DOF and AFS managers should participate in an annual review of the requirements of the AFS/DOF Annual Operating Plan.	There are many new people in fire management positions with many vacancies to be filled this winter.			
F 08	Require Regional and Area Managers to seek	Currently not required, and from our review			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
d Manager Fire s #08 # 08	out and read unit fire management plans of cooperators within their suppression responsibility.	observations, rarely accomplished			
09 ka Interagency lland Fire agement Plan ew #09 09	Establish an annual review of roles and responsibilities of land managers and suppression agencies.	There is still confusion about roles and responsibilities. There is a need for an annual of roles and responsibilities for everyone involved in fire management in Alaska. It can be quickly covered at the Spring Interagency FMO meeting			
10 d for more fire ram participation e Central Office . # 10 10	Central Office Management staff required to participate in fire program assignments during fire season. Individual Development Plans (IDP) and Individual Training Plans (ITP) initiated by supervisors and developed with employees. 'Every DOF employee is in the Fire Program'	No expectation of participation in the fire program during fire season. DOF has untapped resources that can be utilized for one 14 day assignment per season (or more) without causing institutional collapse.			
11 d for more fire rience at onal level # 11 # 11	When personnel lacking fire experience are hired into a regional level fire management role they should be assigned a mentor and gain progressive experience as identified in an IDP and ITP. There should be a timeline established to complete requirements. As part of the initial employment offer, an IDP should be agreed to and the employee's probationary period extended as necessary to meet the time line established. If new hire do not meet the timeline, they fail to complete probation (at the discretion of supervisor) and are released from DOF employment.	Little expectation of participation in the fire program. Historically, Regional Foresters were expected to participate in IMTs. Lack of exposure and directed participation in fire program in Alaska (IMT) and L48.			
12	When personnel lacking fire experience are	Lack of formalized training and mentorship for new			

‹egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
›d for fire erience in Area ›l management F # 12 # 12	hired into Area Forester or a similar primary fire management position, they should be assigned a mentor and gain progressive experience as identified in an IDP and ITP. There should be a timeline established to complete requirements. As part of the initial employment offer, an IDP should be agreed to and the employee's probationary period extended as necessary to meet the time line established. If new hire do not meet the timeline, they fail to complete probation (at the discretion of supervisor) and are released from DOF employment.	hires lacking fire background. Lack of exposure and directed participation in fire program in Alaska (IMT) and L48.			
F 13 k of management tate Logistics F # 13 # 13	Fill the management positions in SLC with the best possible candidates. If those selected lack experience, require that they take assignments to multiple GACCs and dispatch offices around the country to develop required skills and qualifications within a specific timeline. As part of the initial employment offer, an IDP should be agreed to and the employee's probationary period extended as necessary to meet the time line established. If new hire do not meet the timeline, they fail to complete probation (at the discretion of supervisor) and are released from DOF employment.	All statewide logistical eggs are in one basket. There is no back-up.			
F 14 ›wn Sites data not ılable F # 14 # 14	Develop and maintain Known Sites data in Area Dispatch Offices.	This was a concern of IMTs this past fire season. A general lack of information concerning values at risk.			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
15 Infrastructure # 15 # 15	Upgrade Fairbanks Area Forestry facilities to include designated paved parking for staff. Build a training facility to accommodate annual training of large numbers of EFF, to be used as a briefing room during fire season. Increase workspace and hygiene facilities for technicians. Develop indoor heated parking for a few engines for early and late season. Condemn current crew trailer facility and upgrade Delta Area Forestry suppression crew facilities to include hygiene facilities with enough capacity to accommodate overhead on temporary assignment to DAF.	Fairbanks Area facilities are dilapidated and are the physical representation of the program to the public.			
16 of a statewide for Tanker Base ram #16 16	Designate a statewide lead and point of contact for tanker base issues to work on standardization of staffing, training and infrastructure. Develop standby list of qualified help to quickly assist a Tanker Base during developing fire situations for short term assignments while the resource order system finds long term help. Develop an ATBM exchange with L48 bases	Palmer and Fairbanks are the only Tanker bases that were designed as such. The others: McGrath, Kenai, Tanacross and Delta were all cobbled together at existing airfields at different times , by different agencies and have a number of different issues. They are covered by Area in this document			
17 al Supervision ram # 17 17	Consolidate DOF and AFS ASM programs. One interagency Lead position for Alaska that will be responsible for training and development of all participants regardless of agency affiliation. Responsible for scheduling and filling needs on the IMTs as well as seats in agency aircraft. The next generation of DOF ASM platform should be able to seat at least four to	There does not appear to be any long term plan for the program. Reacting to events instead of planning for them. DOF is currently lacking a second qualified Air Tactical Pilot and Air Tactical Supervisor and consequently can only staff one Aerial Supervision module (ASM) or lead plane. How can DOF honor its own policy with one lead and two airtankers?			

egory mber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
	accommodate trainees. Develop a trigger point for ordering additional lead plane/ASM capability to Alaska until DOF trainees are fully qualified. Consolidated interagency scheduling of airtankers, leads and ATS to ensure Alaska has no accidental gaps in coverage. Consolidate briefings for incoming aviation crews to provide a consistent quality product.				
F 18 F Lead Plane cy confusion F# 18 # 18	Ensure all DOF Dispatch Offices and FMOs understand and comply with by existing DOF policy.	Policy is clear order lead or ASM every time you order an airtanker: Current DOF policy: In addition to the requirements of IASG, low level aerial supervision (ASM or Lead) shall be ordered, via the interagency AICC/dispatch system, whenever an airtanker/retardant is ordered for a fire. The DOF Airtanker vendor Conair has company policy that precludes their tankers from going 'low level' and dropping retardant until a lead or ASM has gone 'low level' over the drop area and deemed it safe. "The Division of Forestry has agreed to that policy with our contractual obligation to Conair".			
F #19 ation Program F #19 #19	Internal DOF Aviation Program Audit to identify total costs of the current program. Perform a cost analysis of programmatic conversion from owned or leased aircraft with DOF maintenance, to exclusive use aircraft contracts with contracted pilots and maintenance.	Ascertain true operating costs of DOF owned/leased aviation program. Hangar facility, maintenance inventory, maintenance and pilot positions, aircraft maintenance costs, ferry flights and aircraft lease costs. Moving aircraft every three to four days to facilitate			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
	Return to basing a tactical aircraft and pilot in Fairbanks. Reduce the number of flights and related costs, lost availability, and excessive wear and tear on aircraft due to ferry flights to Palmer to facilitate crew relief and maintenance	crew relief and maintenance.			
#20 coms #20 20	Designate a primary point of contact for Safecoms with the responsibility of tracking trends as they are received and correcting issues as they are identified instead of after the fire season is over.	Dennis Ricker -Coastal RAM mentioned in the DOF Fall Review that 34 Safecoms were filed and that they were just then being analyzed for trends. He also mentioned this was the only mechanism for tracking problems. Rocky Ansell- Safety presentation at DOF Fall review cited 34 Safecoms concerning lead planes and helicopter managers (policy) and damaged aircraft (field) consisting of'(several' helicopters and T-51.			
#21 o Repeater lems #21 21	Upgrade DOF communications infrastructure. Investigate an agreement with AFS to utilize Radio Shop to augment or replace SOA ETS capability.	Widespread repeater problems throughout fire season. Two AFS loaner air to grounds utilized – one in Tok and one at KIDC			
#22 of statewide nuity in house and supply ions between #22 22	Initiate a statewide warehouse and cache review to determine the optimal cost effective structure based on mission needs: caches versus warehouses.	Was the current arrangement due to an organizational need or a pay grade issue? If Area consolidations are considered this would be an element for consideration.			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
F # 23 'banks Area ıdside Program F 23 ᄀ #1	Improve Roadside Program.	Fairbanks Technicians displayed little enthusiasm for their roadside mission.			
F # 24 'banks Area icopter Managers F # 24 ᄀ #2	FAF needs to develop more helicopter managers.	Very limited availability. Not much enthusiasm in the ranks for being a helicopter manager			
F # 25 'banks Area patch F # 25 ᄀ # 3	Improve facility	The building age, layout, and systems are not conducive to a smooth operation.			
F # 26 'banks Area rk force retention F # 26 ᄀ #4	Improve workplace facilities Salary Study	I had several lower level technicians tell me they were only staying with DOF long enough to get the red card qualifications to be hired as an EFF at a higher wage.			
F # 27 ta Area Forestry › Atlas F # 27 F # 1	Delta Area doesn't maintain a map atlas as required by the AIWFMP.				
F 28 ta Area Forestry Helibase Mgr F #28 F # 2	Hire helibase manager position.	Helibase lacks consistent qualified supervision. Leaving helicopter manager position represents a draw down on an already limited DAF experience pool available for other roles.			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
? #29 a Area Forestry space and ronmental ? #29 ?# 3	Prioritize alternate helibase/helispot development for high wind conditions and missile defense airspace closures. Have land use agreements signed before helicopter arrives for the season				
? # 30 a Area Forestry a CWPP ? # 30 ? # 4	Complete the Delta Wildfire Community Protection Plan	CWPP needs to be completed to qualify as eligible for most fire related grants.			
? # 31 Area Forestry k Force retention ? #31 ' # 1	Salary Study	I had several EFF tell me that a DOF technician job wasn't attractive. The salary was less and the benefits were seasonal . You normally don't get the time off to use benefits when you have them.			
? # 32 Area Forestry atch ? # 32 ' # 2	Fill the dispatch positions in Tok with the best possible candidates. If those selected lack experience, require that they take assignments to multiple dispatch offices around the country to develop required skills and qualifications within a specific timeline. As part of the initial employment offer, an IDP should be agreed to and the employee's probationary period extended as necessary to meet the time line established. If new hire do not meet the timeline, they fail to complete probation (at the discretion of supervisor) and are released from DOF	Tok dispatch is a shell in need of constant reinforcement. Tok dispatch was unable to function without outside support for the entire fire season.			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
	employment If unable to staff TOK Dispatch look at Area consolidation options.				
F # 33 . Area Forestry across rdant site F # 33 F # 3	Seek legislative support for AK DOT assuming control of Tanacross Airport.	No drainage system No containment system 24/6 Runway Useable 12/30 Runway unusable Ownership of Airfield BLM FDO No mowing and no maintenance by owner			
F # 34 ıai itack F # 34 AF # 1	Improve Helitack capability	There is no Helitack crew No schedule of HECMs – only a fill in day by day with techs or EFF Helitack facility was small and cramped. Not much more room than the space available for pilot, mechanic and manager staff. No SAFECOMs have been submitted in 2009 by the DOF in Kenai although there were several incidents including Evergreen bucket failures			
F # 35 .ai dside F # 35 AF # 2	Improve Roadside capability	Each engine had an assigned Module Leader but it appeared that there were no crews assigned to the engines. There was a large dependency on Emergency Fire Fighters to staff the trucks. Only the type VI engines were staffed. Two type IV engines were parked unstaffed. Overnight gear was not brought aboard the engines. There doesn't seem to be an organizational norm of staying out on fires overnight.			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
? # 36 ai ker Base ? #36 AF # 3	Develop an Airtanker Base Manager Develop facilities such as a wash down pit, drainage system and water supply. Develop a standby facility for aircrews and smokejumpers temporarily based at the Kenai Retardant Site	There is no Air Tanker Base Manager There is no wash down pit, no drainage, no containment dikes, needs cement pads, no Interagency Airtanker Base Operations Guide (IABOG). The water system is barely adequate and goes through numerous plumbing routes to reach the base. A well should be dug near the base or a professional water system installed Base is essentially a single wide trailer. There needs to be room for pilots, aircraft time keeping, a radio operator, airtanker base manager, ramp manager and mix master, briefing area, etc			
? # 37 ai C ht coordination · USFWS Refuge ? # 37 AF # 4	Develop a protocol for all fire related flights over the Kenai Refuge. Recommend all fire related flights over the Kenai refuge be communicated to KIDC whether KIDC or another office does the flight following and flight scheduling.	There is currently no protocol for coordination of flights over the Kenai Refuge between the USFWS and AK DOF.			
? # 38 ai C Detailers ? # 38 AF # 5	Develop organic staff at KIDC to alleviate reliance on detailers.	KIDC seems to be dependent on detailers The dispatchers were aware of flights by the USFWS – but none of their flights were scheduled through dispatch. There was a feeling that KIDC was to inform the Refuge of flights within the refuge.			
? # 39 ai ıer age facility ? # 39 AF # 6	Develop adequate storage, to include hazmat, for Homer facility.	Storage facility for equipment was shared with DOT and not adequate. Facility lacked basic safety and housekeeping guidelines. Hazmat storage cabinet was lacking and haz mat was mingled with various construction materials and fire gear.			

egory nber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
F # 40 ıai ner rk/Rest F # 40 AF # 7	Ensure all DOF employees understand work/rest requirements. Enforce work/rest requirements.	When questioned about rehabbing fire equipment after an initial attack, one fire fighter mentioned that he was given a couple of hours rest and a couple hours to rehab equipment and sent back to the East End Road Fire the next morning. This showed a lack of understanding concerning the work/rest ratio policies in wildland fire (two to one and up to 24 hours for initial attack).			
F # 41 thwest District: k of initial attack ıbility, lack of :nded attack ıbility. F # 41 AF# 1	Assign more IA staff to McGrath. Review Staffing and Action Guide for trigger points to order more support. Investigate the conversion of some support positions into operations positions as they become available through attrition.	There has been a steady deterioration of the Division of Forestry's ability to protect federal land within DOF's protection responsibility. No expectations stated in the DOF/AFS annual operating plan of DOF capability to perform detection/surveillance or initial attack for federal land managers, or ability to relieve smokejumpers in a timely manner.			
F # 42 thwest District s of exclusive use raft F # 42 AF # 2	Reinstate detection /surveillance/admin aircraft contract.	How do you cover 67 million road-less acres and provide fire detection/surveillance service to customers under the AIWFMP without a dedicated aircraft? Southwest District is the only suppression entity with a protection area of this nature without a dedicated aircraft in Alaska. GADL, TAD and UYD all have dedicated fixed wings.			
F # 43 thwest District k of depth and wledge in ıagement of roles responsibilities. F # 43 AF # 3	When personnel lacking fire experience are hired into Area Forester or a similar primary fire management position, they should be assigned a mentor and gain progressive experience as identified in an IDP and ITP. There should be a timeline established to complete requirements. As part of the initial employment offer, an IDP should be agreed to and the employee's probationary period extended as necessary to meet the time line established. If new hire	There was much unnecessary confusion and resistance to 'outside' managers. Lack of understanding of management responsibilities to land managers.			

ɛgory ıber	Recommendation	Comments	Proposed Corrective Action	Assigned to	Due Date
	do not meet the timeline, they fail to complete probation (at the discretion of supervisor) and are released from DOF employment.				

Section 6

WSD User

mroos

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Kenai Fire Programs Review

June 7-8, 2009

Interview with DOF FMO

- **USFS** operations are now in Moose Pass. Dave Lockwood is the FMO for the Chugach. There is a Type 6 engine with four firefighters. There is a prevention tech located there and a Fuels Crew of four people. The Chugach NF pays 10% of the Exclusive Use Type II Helicopter located in Soldotna.
- **Aviation**: He was open to looking at the use of SEATs as discussed in a 2001 Aviation Review. CL-215s appeared to be a good tool for the geographical area of the Kenai. Air Tanker base is in a good location in Kenai for loading air tankers and flying to fires on the peninsula. Concern for airspace safety with USFWS launching aircraft to monitor fires when KIDC is launching aircraft.
- **USFWS** – has had good working relationship with Kenai National Wildlife Refuge in the past – but has felt more resistance to cooperation and tension regarding fire management. The FMO perceives the USFWS to be looking to be more autonomous and independent from the AK DOF. There appears to be confusion by the USFWS as to the roles of fire suppression versus fire management. USFWS is receiving stimulus money for fuels – but the personnel and equipment for fuels bought with stimulus dollars could also be used for fire suppression. There was discussion as to costs for fire suppression on the Refuge and how those dollars were tracked. It was determined that the costs go through the state and each line item is approved by the AFS Southern Zone FMO. The state is short staffed for fire fighters on the Kenai and the USFWS wants to get their folks fire suppression experience, so there may be opportunities for shared resources and a cooperative agreement for a mutual response area.

Preparedness Review with fire suppression resources in Soldotna.

- **Helicopter:** Type II with manager was moved to McGrath. Call-When-Needed Type III Helicopter with EFF Helicopter Manager and DOF Helicopter Manager Trainee assigned for the day. Since the BLM preparedness checklists are BLM policy specific – I used them as a guide and below are my general observations.
    - The Manager and Manager Trainee had completed load calculations and manifests. They were aware of the need for power checks every 10 hours and were completing them. They were aware of the SAFECOM system – but I noticed no SAFECOMs have been submitted in 2009 by the DOF in Kenai although there were several incidents including Evergreen bucket failures. Both were very knowledgeable of helicopter operations – but the EFF manager was departing the next day after a two week assignment. The following day there was a new helitack manager – who was also responsible for other duties at the station. This individual appeared to be wearing several hats. Consistency was lacking.

- There is no chase truck (for additional tools, pumps, overnight gear, fuel, helibase set up, etc.)
- There is no Helitack crew. There is a manager and a manager trainee that serves as his assistant – but not the BLM agency minimum crew size of 7. No schedule of HECMs – only a fill in day by day with techs or EFF staff.
- In my opinion, there should be a minimum of three firefighters on board for an initial attack. The current load on the A-Star B-2 was two with equipment (pumps, bucket, and tools). I would suggest cutting back on equipment and fuel and flying with an IA load of three firefighters.
- Crash Rescue – fire extinguishers and fueling was adequate at the base.
- Helitack facility was small and cramped. Not much more room than the space available for pilot, mechanic and manager.
- Overall the two people were competent in their jobs – able to deploy the bucket and understood emergency procedures.

- **Engine Reviews:**
  - **Soldotna:** Engine crews successfully started the chainsaws, drafted water and pumped water through a simple hose lay. Briefings and AARs were thorough.
    - Each engine had an assigned Module Leader but it appeared that there were no crews assigned to the engines. There was a large dependency on Emergency Fire Fighters to staff the trucks.
    - Only the type VI engines were staffed. Two type IV engines were parked unstaffed.
    - Overnight gear was not brought aboard the engines.
  - **Homer**: Engine crew was successful at starting the chainsaw, drafting water and pumping water through a simple hose lay.
    - PT program was in place.
    - Storage facility for extra equipment was shared with DOT and not adequate.
    - Storage facility lacked basic safety and housekeeping guidelines.
    - HAZ Mat. Locker/storage cabinet was lacking and haz mat was mingled with various construction materials and fire gear.
    - When questioned about rehabbing fire equipment after an initial attack, one fire fighter mentioned that he was given a couple of hours rest and a couple hours to rehab equipment and sent back to the East End Road Fire the next morning. This showed a lack of understanding concerning the work/rest ratio policies in wildland fire (two to one and up to 24 hours for initial attack).
- **KIDC:** Cooperation between the USFS and DOF appeared to be going well. They have almost outgrown their facility after their first year. Dispatchers were aware of the importance of tracking aviation resources; flight following and following the aviation mishap response plan in the event of an aircraft accident or missing aircraft. The USFS detailer from Montana had worked in KIDC last year and thought things were going well. There is confusion as to the role of SLCC – why have an intermediary coordination center between a dispatch center and a GACC? Certainly not a question I could answer. The dispatchers were aware of flights by the

USFWS – but none of their flights were scheduled through dispatch. There was a feeling that KIDC was to inform the Refuge of flights within the refuge. There was concern also of the proposed Annual Operation Plan between the USFS, AK DOF, and USFWS and the work load and new responsibilities that the dispatch would have under the proposal.

- **Kenai Airtanker Base:** Competent Mix-master (Lynn). He is knowledgeable about airtanker and retardant operations. He is making the best of the current facilities and utilities. The mix master is proactive in testing the batches, recording results and adjusting the mix. He has sent samples to Interagency Testing Facility and has received feedback. He is also measuring retardant flow and recording results.

    - There is no Air Tanker Base Manager
    - There is no wash down pit, no drainage, no containment dikes, needs cement pads, no Interagency Airtanker Base Operations Guide (IABOG). The water system is barely adequate and goes through numerous plumbing routes to reach the base. A well should be dug near the base or a professional water system installed.
    - The entire operation should be moved off of the airport ramp and towards the gate and road leading in to the base.
    - Being located at the Kenai airport is advantageous for crash-fire rescue response, fueling, security, and wind indicators and airspace/aircraft separation and communication.
    - Mix Master thinks that use of the SEATs and Scoopers would benefit fire suppression on the Kenai.
    - Tank maintenance was being done during time of review.
    - EFF personnel brought on to supplement the mix master.
    - Additional warning signage is needed.
    - Base is essentially a single wide trailer. There needs to be room for pilots, aircraft time keeping, a radio operator, airtanker base manager, ramp manager and mix master, briefing area, etc. The IABOG provides more details for items needed in the Readiness Review section.

USFWS Interview

- Attended by FMO Doug, AFMO Dianne, Jan Passek, acting regional FMO and two techs.
- Fuels treatments are both mechanical and Rx fire. Strategy is to change from conifer to hardwoods which provides for natural fuel breaks. Most burns are scheduled for late June through July. It is difficult to meet the minimum required personnel to complete the burns. They are allowed to use ADs (Administratively Determined)fire fighters for prescribed fires.
- Currently there is two Type VI Engines, one Type IV Engine and a 300 gallon tracked vehicle. At the time of the review there was only one Engine Boss (besides

management) available to operate the equipment. There are several "militia" refuge workers that are red carded to help in Rx burning and wildfire response. There is a 20 person cache to support these folks if the need arises.

- Aircraft consist of: miscellaneous on-call aircraft brought on for resource work and prescribed fires. Also, there are two fleet aircraft a Super Cup and Cessna 185 for "detection".
- There are a high number of visitors to the refuge (insinuating the potential for human caused starts?).
- There is no way to pay USFWS to standby for DOF fires.
- The Refuge would like to find out how to get fire costs in a timely manner. Do they go through the State? AFS Southern Zone?
- They feel that 620 Chapter 2 is no longer working. They feel that the USFWS and NPS is not included in the administrative processes.
- They feel that through Agreements and Annual Operating Plans this could be worked out. Closest forces concept should be the standard.
- Although there is acceptance of DM 620 Chapter 2 as policy, they don't believe AFS is interpreting it the same way as they are.
- Fire costs that are passed on to USFWS that they have concerns about include the state of AK hiring EFF when there are USFWS firefighters available. Other costs include daily flights by the state contracted Bell 212 to recon a ½ acre fire in the rain.
- KIDC doesn't involve USFWS as much as they would like to be involved.
- CL 215 use on the Kenai Peninsula is supported by the USFWS and they may have funding available to support it.
- ***Corrective Action Needed:*** There is currently no coordination for flights over the refuge on the Kenai between the USFWS and AK DOF. KIDC expects the USFWS to notify them if they plan to fly over a smoke. USFWS expects KIDC to call them before flying to a smoke in the refuge. There is one Air to Air frequencies for the Kenai Peninsula. Managers at the refuge don't believe that their aircraft need to call out on that frequency or contract dispatch when flying to a smoke on the refuge. The current attitude of "I don't have to call you, **you** have to call **me**" and no protocol of coordinating through KIDC and communicating on a pre-set air to air frequency is an unacceptable risk. I recommend all flights be communicated to KIDC weather KIDC or another office does the flight following and flight scheduling. There is a predetermined air to air frequency that KIDC uses for the entire peninsula, but the Refuge doesn't monitor it or use it when they monitor fires or patrol for fires.

mroos

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Western Alaska Study

The Group:

Doug Alexander – USFWS Region 7 FMO -

Marsha Henderson – DOF

Judy Reese- DOF Coastal Region FMO

Ray Kraemer- DOF McGrath FMO

Tom St. Clair– AFS Acting Galena Zone FMO

Marlene Eno-Hendren- AFS TAL Zone

Mike Roos- AFS Fire Mgmt Resources

The Mission

Look at the current organizations:

Staffing

Facilities

Workload

Missions

Look for opportunities to reduce redundancy gain efficiencies, save money, redirect resources.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Issues

Commercial Infrastructure:

McGrath has 1 commercial flight/day

McGrath has 3 barges a year – water level

Galena has 4 commercial flights/day (3FAI, 1 ANC)

Galena has a barge every 21 days during season

ISSUES

Existing Agency Infrastructure:

McGrath has Retardant Site –in need of repair/upgrade

McGrath has stable Utilities

Galena has no Retardant Site

Galena Water and Sewer problematic

Issues

- Retardant – Future of Fed Use?

  Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE) sued the USFS, USFWS and Marine Fisheries for not addressing Aerial Retardant impacts in their NEPA documents.

  In Federal Court in Montana –Judge gave a deadline of 12/2011 to correct.

Under Consideration

Judy Reese proposal on creating an ICS IMT Model for Western AK:

IC

Deputy IC

Air Ops

Ops

Plans

Finance

Logistics

Under Consideration

Merged Traditional Structure:

FMO

AFMO –North

AFMO-South

Unit Aviation Mgr

Dispatch Supervisor

Logistics Supervisor

Product

- We are tasked with having a report out by this fall.
- Please address any concerns/ideas to your POC
- Stay Tuned!

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
Fire Occurence by Month 1990 - 2010
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
Fire Occurence by Day 1990 - 2010
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
Fire History by Month 1939 - 2011
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
Fire History by Day - 1939 - 2010
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Western Alaska Solution Working Group Progress Report August 2011

In the late spring of 2011 John Gould , manager of the Alaska Fire Service (AFS) , and Chris Maisch, State Forester and director of the State of Alaska, Division of Forestry (DOF) , formed the Western Alaska Solution Working Group. The group's purpose is to explore the feasibility of combining the resources of the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, Division of Forestry (DOF) and the Bureau of Land Management Alaska Fire Service (AFS) in Western Alaska with the goal of creating a more efficient and cost effective wildland fire suppression organization

The group consists of:

Michael Roos AFS Chief Fire Management Resources
Doug Alexander USFWS Region 7 FMO (representing USFWS, NPS, and BIA)
Tom St. Clair AFS Acting FMO Galena Zone
Marlene Eno-Hendren AFS AFMO Tanana Zone
Judy Reese DOF Coastal Region FMO
Marsha Henderson DOF Strategic Planner
Ray Kraemer FMO McGrath Area

The above group was told to look at the full range of services provided by the BLM in Galena and the State of Alaska in McGrath and determine the following:

1. Can a combined interagency organization in Western Alaska adequately provide suppression services over the protection area?
2. What facilities would be needed to support a combined suppression organization and should they be located in Galena or McGrath?
3. What is an appropriate organizational structure for a combined operation?
4. What resources and support services are required for a combined operation?
5. What is the best use for the station not chosen to support the combined operation?
6. What is the anticipated time line and funding requirement for any changes to take place?

To date the group has reviewed the following:

- Fire history of Western Alaska.
- Preparedness workload of the Galena and McGrath programs.
- EFF Crew Program administration and training workloads of the Galena and McGrath programs.
- CASHE audit findings of 2011 inspections of Galena and McGrath facilities.
- Existing private sector air transportation and river barge support of Galena and McGrath.
- Existing DOI assets in Western AK that may be available to assist detection and demobilization.
- History of the Galena and McGrath programs and changes in their missions over time.

To date the group has reached the following conclusions:

- The nature of the fire mission has changed in Western Alaska.
- Ongoing review of fire protection levels has occurred. Reviews have resulted in many downgrades in protection status from full and modified, to limited.
- Fewer occurrences of large scale remote suppression actions.
- Less occurrence of Type II IMT deployment on remote fires.
- Shift to use of Type III IMT organizations deployed on remote fires.
- More frequent and detailed fire monitoring, mapping and reporting required by land managers.
- Loss of heavy paracargo capability to supply remote suppression operations.
- For extended suppression actions there has been a logistical shift to the use of nearby village airstrips as staging areas.
- Increase in HAZMAT awareness and enforcement has led to expensive correction action of past practices and in some cases loss of remote support capacity.
- Chronic lack of funding for appropriate maintenance of field stations.
- Little to no replacement of remote support capacity lost.

Brief initial answers to primary questions:

1. **Can a combined interagency organization in Western Alaska adequately provide suppression services over the protection area?** Yes, we are already doing it by default. The reality is that AFS is already providing the initial attack service through smokejumper support. DOF is providing the support service by staffing the support facility at McGrath. DOF currently has one firefighter to staff their Type II helicopter. DOF has never invested in a robust initial attack capability in Southwest Area and has no plans to do so.
2. **What facilities would be needed to support a combined suppression organization and should they be located in Galena or McGrath?** Those already in place at McGrath and Galena. Location of choice: Galena. Galena has more reliable commercial aviation and river barge freight support. Overall, the facilities at Galena are in better condition than McGrath. Galena is more centrally located in the area of highest historical fire occurrence and areas designated for protection action(Modified and Full protection).
3. **What is an appropriate organizational structure for a combined operation?** Larger than the currently funded organization at either program. There are currently 22 positions funded by DOF in McGrath and 24 funded by AFS in Galena. There are many redundant support positions when viewed as a single unit. The ultimate disposition of 'surplus' positions would depend on which reorganization option (presented later in this paper) is considered. As an example, if option 1 below was chosen, DOF would give AFS the dollar value of half of the current McGrath positions (11) in an agreement, AFS could fund additional smokejumper, fire specialist or support positions to be utilized in Western Alaska. DOF would also realize the benefit of the surplus of 11 positions which if reassigned to the Kenai would revert back to the DOF base wage instead of the McGrath 37% premium pay. This would allow DOF to grow funding for one

additional position for every three transferred out of McGrath. More research is required to determine the reality and timelines of DOF taking 'adverse' actions against union employees – Local 71 Labor, Trades and Crafts (LTC), ASEA General Government Unit (GGU) and APEA Supervisory (SS).

4. **What resources and support services are required for a combined operation?** The same that are required now in Galena and McGrath with the exception being that this support must be more mobile and able to relocate between Galena and remote staging areas as needed. Galena would require an available second fixed wing aircraft for detection and monitoring to the south in June and July.
5. **What is the best use for the station not chosen to support the combined operation?** Turnkey or complete shutdown. This would depend on the future option chosen and the disposition of the current Type II Crew Program in McGrath. Would the McGrath facility be necessary to hire and transport crews in that region? If not, the workload for signing up, outfitting, feeding and housing crews coming out of Southwest would fall to another entity. Another scenario is that McGrath would become the FT. Yukon type turnkey for Galena to be opened and staffed as needed.
6. **What is the anticipated time line and funding requirement for any changes to take place?** More research is required relative to the future option chosen.

Identified Options:

1. Northern Southwest Area absorbed into Galena Zone and Southern Southwest absorbed into the Kenai Kodiak Area
    - This option returns to the historic alignment that existed before DOF assumed protection responsibility in McGrath. This is also the alignment of commercial aviation support. The Iliamna, Dillingham and Alaska Peninsula regions are serviced by operations based in Anchorage and Kenai Peninsula. Direct radio communications are also possible between DOF Kenai Kodiak Area Office's KIDC Dispatch and aircraft over Iliamna. Such communication is not possible with McGrath.
    - McGrath is over 100 miles in the wrong direction when supporting fires in this area. The most effective and efficient support is direct from Anchorage or Palmer.
    - Historically, fires in this region have been supported out of staging areas in Iliamna or Dillingham supported directly from Palmer.

2. Status Quo
3. Galena Zone expands to cover all of Southwest Area
    - There would have to be some form of financial support annually from DOF to AFS to enable AFS to increase required organizational capacity. Historically this was accomplished by the payment of a preparedness cost per acre protected. Last utilized in

1983 at the cost of $.06/acre, (2011 value would be $.16/acre) or a mutually agreed rate.

4. AFS assumes protection responsibility for McGrath and Southwest Area and DOF assumes protection responsibility for all of the Alaska Interior road accessible areas to include eagle, Circle, Central, Minto and Manley.
    - This option would allow each program to operate within their organizational strengths: AFS to remote fire and DOF to roadside. DOF is not organizationally structured or equipped for efficient remote fire suppression.
5. An overall review of the division of suppression responsibility in Alaska. Are the assumptions on which the original agreement were based still valid? Are the current suppression boundaries still appropriate?

We anticipate the final briefing paper to be available before the stated 11/11/11 due date.

WSD User

mroos

Microsoft Word - Western AK wrap up

10/21/19 12:48 PM

It is the consensus of the project leads Michael Roos (BLM), Marsha Henderson (SOA DOF) and Douglas Alexander (DOI) that Western Alaska can't be isolated as a unique circumstance for possible efficiencies. All of Alaska has to be looked at collectively as decisions made for one region have an impact on adjacent regions.

Several things have occurred since the original suppression agreement between the state of Alaska and the Bureau of Land management Alaska Fire service.

The Alaska Interagency Fire Management Plan:
End result is that a major assumption of the initial agreement is no longer valid. In the document it is stated that roadside fires are less expensive than remote fires.

Demographics:
Significant change in demographics within DOF's area of Suppression responsibility. The population has increased significantly along the Alaska roadnet while the remote areas with the exception of the coast (historical low fire occurrence) have had a decrease in population.

More complete picture of historical fire occurrence:
In the initial planning effort for the reciprocal fire agreement, Southcentral Alaska was in a historical lull in fire activity. This may have led to an underestimate if DOF's fire risk and exposure in Southcentral Alaska.

It is the consensus of the leads of the working group that rather than looking exclusively at Galena and McGrath for possible efficiencies in Alaska interagency fire suppression. The scope needs to be expanded to include all of Alaska and the current distribution of fire suppression responsibility in Alaska. Programmatic capabilities and focus such as remote or roadside should be weighted in the potential redistribution of suppression responsibility:

Demographic numbers
Fire History Maps

As both the Alaska Fire Service and the Division of forestry are entering periods of reorganization we feel that a study of suppression responsibilities be completed sooner rather than later so that results may be reflected in organizational change.

WSD User

mroos

Microsoft Word - Western Alaska Review

10/21/19 12:49 PM

Here is the List that I worked up. I added some of the points from yesterday's conversation. Please feel free to add items you feel have been overlooked. Please send the items to be and I will keep a master list updated. Thanks-Mike

Western Alaska Review Topics for investigation:

Scope of contacts:
State of Alaska
State of AK Division of Mining, Lands and Water - Southcentral Region and Northern Region
State of Alaska Division of Forestry – what level/office
Structure Fire Departments – How many and where – agreements in place for exchange of funds?
DOT -Airports
BLM
USFWS- Refuges identified with HQ locations
NPS- Parks identified with HQ locations
Regional Native Corporations profit and non-profit identified with HQ locations
Village Governments- identified with addresses
Village Corp Cooperatives – identified with addresses
The Kuskokwim Corporation
MTNT
Trooper Detachments - locations
Borough Governments-locations and HQ
Military Installations: location and controlling authority (Sparravohn, Tatalina)

Logistics:
Ability to support bases using existing commercial infrastructure:
Frequency of barge service Galena versus McGrath
Frequency of commercial flights Galena versus McGrath
Frequency of air freight Service Galena versus McGrath
Current Utility costs for Galena versus McGrath?
Projected increase in costs Galena versus McGrath - if chosen as primary base for Western AK?
Mechanisms for utility payment Galena versus McGrath –can you charge fire numbers?
Who will be the lead agency?
- IT support to include radio
- IT accounts and system access for non- agency employees
- Warehouse support AFS Cache or State Fire Warehouse
- Vendors and fire business management –procurement-whose regs?
- Dining facilities and business practices and support?
-availability of hotels and B&Bs to supplement base housing?
- Which Fire Business Practices will be followed? Fed or State?
- What tactical meetings would be attended –State and AFS?
- Each agency owns personnel and equipment- who controls them?

- Crew management (Training, testing, and records maintenance, payroll and admin) agency requirements ICS versus IQCS and hiring

Facilities:
-Facility Assessments- MCG and GAL
-phone systems, condition and expansion capability
-warehouse condition and capacity MCG versus GAL
- Radio communications systems-
- IT bandwidth-current capability and possibility /cost of expansion
- What is required for BLM bandwidth support for multiple workers in McGrath?
- Office space-is facility large enough to house needed functions and expansion required?
- Phone jacks/data jacks what would be required?
- Housing- for employees and assigned resources –enough? Requirements?
- Dining facilities –physical assessment, replacement or expansion plans?
-Potential for expansion adjacent property-interagency participation (FWS)
-Current DOT airport leases/ costs
-Cache Audit Dates –participation required –get it from the horse's mouth
- Fueling contracts in place at Galena versus McGrath. What are the costs and capacities?
-Retardant Site at McGrath-what condition is it in –lifespan
- Ramp space available Galena versus McGrath – expansion capability –portable retardant ?

Available Assigned Aviation Resources:
2- Type II helicopters
1-Type III helicopter
1 AC-680 fixed wing
What are the current agency (owner) expectations of use of these aircraft? Will that change in the new configuration?

What is the current need for aerial assets and what infrastructure is needed to support those assets? Do we still need a retardant base?

Available assigned Personnel Resources:
-current org charts of both organizations

Support Planning- expansion with fire activity:
Staffing and Action Guides –what does AFS have?
How this is currently handled Galena versus McGrath?

Current dispatch strengths/weakness/needs by org
- Staffing issues
- Depth and experience
- Federal requirements versus DOF requirements for dispatch

- IT capability and support including Radio and GIS
- Issues for interagency computer accounts

GIS Requests:

Land ownership breakout-surface
Protection Level breakout by level/acres
Alaska Native Regional and Village corporations
Crew Locations
Distance circles-speed/duration of AC 680
Runway and ramp size research-what airports are viable Forward Operating Bases (FOB)
Aircraft fueling options – locations of commercial fuel (AMD)
Communications Infrastructure –current and proposed repeater locations and freqs.
Locations of Agency Fuel Caches
Fire History/Frequency Map
Historical fire occurrence
- Peak periods of ignitions and IA: determine timelines for different latitudes –what are the numbers?
Fuels mapping –Galena versus McGrath
Known Sites Database
-SHPO data –historical and cultural
- Hazmat
Imagery
- Commercial Villages (Donlin Creek Mine, Pebble Mine)
- airports
- villages
Protection Area review –probability of taking action across the western landscape-focal points

Things to consider:

New/ old ways of doing business:
Moving the lines on suppression responsibility –ripple effect of consolidations/expansions to adjacent Zones/Areas.
Protection acreage imbalance resolution with changes in suppression responsibility

Consider redistribution of responsibility along historic patterns – Kenai taking over Iliamna and AK Pen. See map.
Identification of viable forward Operating bases –Is there a viable store from which you can replenish jumper food boxes- and support local economy. Fuel, ramp space, Fire department for office space phone contact –fax, etc.?
Jumper concerns out west are food, fuel, and a place to sleep. Emphasis on bath house facilities and quality pilot housing for adequate rest.
Housing for dispatchers and admin support? Non -ops types are getting older and a bit more fragile.
Retirees (ADs)

-Investigate Cache potential for forward storage of pumps, hose, and fuel and crew kits for timely long range response. AK Pen, Seward Peninsula, Kobuk, Noatak.

-Impacts associated with dimishing current capability at McGrath and Galena – Crew mobilizations, etc.

Section 7

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mroos

AFS_DOF Boundary Project Meeting Sep 2012.pdf

10/21/19 12:34 PM

AFS-DOF Boundary Project meeting
September 27, 2012

Attendees:
Steve Theisen – Upper Yukon Zone FMO
Mike Butteri – Tanana Zone FMO
Jake Dollard – acting-Military-South Zone FMO
Hudson Plass – Galena Zone Coordination Center Manager
Dave Whitmer – Chief, Branch of Fire Operations
Mike Roos – Chief, Fire Management Resources Section

Dave Whitmer was invited to participate because of his background as the Galena FMO.
Mike Roos was invited to participate because of his background as a State of Alaska employee and former McGrath FMO.

Notes:
The ground rules were:

- Per Kent changing the current boundary was not up for discussion.
  (This was my understanding from my conversations with Kent.)
- We will do the best we can to look at the new AFS "landscape" as a blank slate and not discuss changes from the view point of moving existing Zone boundaries.
- We will not bring village crew management into the discussion. There are already 3-4 variables that need to be considered and adding crew management will make it almost impossible to balance the workload.

The discussion began by agreeing to the elements which define a Zones workload. The elements agreed to are:

- Training
- Dispatch
- Fire Suppression
- Fire Management (those pieces of fire suppression dealing with Land Managers, etc.)
- Support (warehouse, Housing, Dining, etc)
- Detection/Surveillance
- Facilities/Maintenance
- Communications (IT, Radio, etc.)
- Administrative
- Aviation (Ramp, Retardant, Fuel Sites, Aircraft)

Discussion:
There was a great deal of discussion regarding the Pros and Cons of the new boundary.
There was some very serious concern expressed regarding the new AFS-DOF Boundary being Final.
Most of the participants felt that there are some very serious implications for both parties which may not have been considered. If the real goal was for the State to reduce the amount of burnable acreage that they protect to around 107 million acres, the general feeling was that there may be other ways to get there that would be more beneficial for both parties while still taking advantage each others Initial Attack strengths.

There were many questions about expectations by both AFS and the DOF as outcomes of the discussions while generating the new boundary. (e.g. – Is there an expectation that AFS will maintain the retardant site in McGrath)

Questions:

1. Does State Protection include the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands? Where does their protection area terminate on the AK Pen? Should there be another red line?
2. What determination was made for burnable acres within the proposed new DOF protection area? Are there any acreage exclusions within the polygon? If so, what are they?
3. What is the total number of claimed 'burnable' acres within the New DOF Protection polygon?

[These are the initial questions submitted, attendees agreed to provide other questions to be added to this document and then provided to the Manager and Associate Manager for discussion at the next meeting.]

Alternatives:

A number of Alternatives were discussed.

- The creation of a 4th Zone to assume management of the Southwest Protection Polygon.
- Adding staff to the Southern part of the Military-South Zone to deal with the management of fires in the Southwest Protection Polygon
- Adding all of the Southwest Protection Polygon to the existing Galena Zone.

Preferred Alternative:

The preferred alternative in general terms is:

- Polygon 1: Follows the new boundary from the Canadian border to the Pipeline corridor; follows the pipeline corridor North and then heading West along the Northern boundary of the Gates of the Artic National Park and Preserve, the Noatak National Preserve, and the Cape Krusenstern National Monument.
  This polygon would include all of the North Slope and a majority of the remaining Upper Yukon Zone.

- Polygon 2: The Northern and Eastern border will be the Southern and Western border of Polygon 1. The Southern border will begin at the new boundary line on the Tanana River near Manly Hot Springs; follow a line t the Southwest and intersect the Southeast corner of the Nowitna Wildlife Refuge; follows the Southern border of the Refuge; off of the Southwest corner of the Refuge follows the Nowitna River and then ties into the East side of the Innoko Wildlife Refuge; follows the Southern border of the Innoko Wildlife Refuge to Grayling; then a straight line from Grayling to the West Northwest to St Michaels and Stebbins.

- Polygon 3: Everything south of the Polygon 2 border and West of the new boundary line is Polygon 3.

- The responsibilities of the Military-South Zone remain the same.

At this point there was no serious discussion regarding placement of personnel to manage each Polygon. (i.e. – Staff McGrath, Staff Galena, keep all staff in Fairbanks, etc.)

A large scale map showing these new proposed Protection Polygons will be produced.

The 20 year fire history will be broken out by Polygon for analysis. The fire history will be viewed as: Total Fires and Acres Burned Total Critical fires and acres burned Total Full fires and acres burned Total Modified fires and acres burned Total Limited fires and acres burned. In addition, for each Protection Polygon we will look at the total number of fires which occurred 0 to . acres in si e and total number of fires which occurred at 100 plus acres in si e.

A second meeting was proposed for October 2nd at 1000 to present the proposed Polygons to the Manager and Associate Manager of AFS, review the proposed Polygons, and the fire occurrence history.

Fire Statistics within the Proposed Polygons 1992-2011

Area ID	Total Fires	Total Acres	Critical	Full	Modified	Limited	Small 0-99	Large 100+	Rx etc
1	2	7, 21,21	3	1 1	77	3 7	413	24	41
2	1,2 7	,0 ,243	34	1 7	33	714	2	42	
3	7	4, ,	1	270	133	3	1	2	
Totals	**2,707**	**18,280,454**	**89**	**588**	**546**	**1,436**	**1,760**	**947**	**53**
Other	31	4130 .2	233	1 3	3 4	700	7 02	417	1

Area ID	Ave Fires/Yr	Ave Acres/Yr.	Ave Crit/Yr	Ave Full/Yr	Ave Mod/Yr	Ave Lim/Yr	Ave Small /Yr	Ave Large/ Yr
1	33.1	3 1,0 1	1.	7.	3.	17.	20.7	12.
2	2.	302, 2	1.7	.4	1 .	3 .7	41.4	21.
3	3 .4	230,000	1.0	13.	.7	1 .3	2 .0	13.
Totals	**135.35**	**914,023**	**4.5**	**29.4**	**27.3**	**71.8**	**88.0**	**47.4**
Other	41 .	347,0	2 1.7	3.2	17.7	3 .0	3 .1	20.

Other History of fires ast and South of the new AFS-DOF Boundary.(State and Military-South Zone protection)

mroos

AFS_DOF Boundary Proposal Working Group Agenda Oct 2012.pdf

10/21/19 12:35 PM

AFS-DOF Boundary Proposal Working Group

Agenda for 2012-10-23 meeting

Discussion of the costs to implement the Options
(See the notes from our previous meeting for estimated costs)

- **Proposal 1**
  3 Protection Polygons based on current Proposed AFS-DOF Boundary
  - FMOs suggest placing 2 Zone organizations in Galena.
  - Down-size McGrath and make it a turn-key operation.

- **Proposal 2**
  Based on current proposed AFS-DOF Boundary
  - Current AFS Zones with new added South Zone suppression responsibilities (Alternative A)

- **Proposal 3**
  - Modified McGrath Area Proposal w/added Military-South Zone responsibilities. (Alternative B)
    [Alternative B – State would keep protection responsibility for an area around McGrath consisting of about 85%State owned land.]

Look at the true workload of the different Proposals

Discuss how to move forward with discussions with DOF.

WSD User

mroos

AFS_DOF Boundary Follow Up.pdf

10/21/19 12:33 PM

Subject: FW: AFS-DOF Boundary Follow up
Location: Managers Conference Room

Start: Fri 10/12/2012 1:00 PM
End: Fri 10/12/2012 2:30 PM
Show Time As: Tentative

Recurrence: (none)

Meeting Status: Not yet responded

Organizer: Ribar, Joe M

To: Lien, Lindsey
Sorry I forgot to include you in the initial invitation.

-----Original Appointment-----
From: Ribar, Joe M
Sent: Friday, October 05, 2012 11:38 AM
To: Ribar, Joe M; Theisen, Steve A; Butteri, Michael F; St. Clair, Thomas B; Whitmer, David R; Roos, Michael H; Slaughter, Kent W; DeFries, Tamala J
Subject: AFS-DOF Boundary Follow up
When: Friday, October 12, 2012 1:00 PM-2:30 PM (UTC-09:00) Alaska.
Where: Managers Conference Room

Agenda:
Reports, input, discussion relative to estimated costs for the three (3) non-status quo Alternatives.

Mike R - Burnable vs Unburnable acres

Steve-Mike-Tom - Cost to staff GAL with 2 Zones; Cost to downsize MCG and operate as a "turn-key" base

Jake - Cost to manage the Southern part of the Military-South Zone as a suppression zone if DOF stays in MCG; cost to fully staff to manage all of the current MCG Area from Palmer/ANC

Meeting Notes:
October 12 1300

Attendees:
Tami Defries
Dave Whitmer
Mike Roos
Steve Theisen
Pat O'Brien
Mike Butteri
Tom St Clair
Jake Dollard
Joe Ribar
Lindsey Lien

The group met and reviewed the cost estimates of the 4 Proposals that are being considered by AFS at this time. Also, Mike Roos reported that based on the acres which the State has owner of throughout Alaska @90% is burnable.

Proposal 1
3 Protection Polygons

FMOs suggest placing 2 Zone organizations in Galena.
Down-size McGrath and make it a turn-key operation.

Assumptions
- Some current Zone personnel would be utilized to manage the new suppression area.
- Out-station in McGrath would be placed in turn-key status.
- No reduction in level of service provided to customers.

Cost Summary
Staffing - Additional seven (7) Career Seasonal positions @$325,000 annually

Aircraft - Additional fixed wing platform @$350,000 annually for 90 day contract

Facilities - New and upgrade of existing facilities in Galena; down-size McGrath and develop into a turn-key operation @$2.5M to 4.5M in one-time costs.

Annual maintenance & Leases @$70,000 annually
(cost of fuel and electricity for MCG not included)

Total Annual Cost - @$750,000 to $1M

Break Down of Costs
Additional Staffing:

1 CS Asst Center Manager GS-09	$60,000/yr
1 CS Maps and Records/Intel Dispatcher GS-09	$40,000/yr
1 CS Aircraft Dispatcher GS-07	$35,000/yr
1 CS Administrative Assistant GS-07/09	$40,000/yr
1 CS Logistics Manager for MCG GS-09	$60,000/yr
1 CS Cook	$35,000/yr
1 CS Helicopter Manager GS-08	$40,000/yr
Additional Subsistence Costs	$20,000/yr

Facilities (Galena):
- Upgrade employee housing
- Upgrade Administrative/Dispatch building
- Add additional Radio Consoles
- Add New Dining Hall
- Add additional helicopter space

Upgrade phone system
Add computers
(Increased need to move to DOI land (NW runway) - plumbing, etc.

Aviation

Increased logistical and preparedness flights (flight time)
Add (fast) detection/logistics fixed-wing - current SMJ ships would not be able to support. (@$300,000)
Retardant?

McGrath Station (turn-key)

Extra IA needs (SMJ/Helitack)
Lease of ramp space (@$25,000/yr)
Fuel site/Fuel lease in MCG? (@$250,000)
AFS bunkhouse design & building
Dining Hall?
Administrative/Dispatch facility?
Warehouse?
Helibase?
Demolition, etc.
Loss of DOF maintenance funding (-$50,000/yr)
Radio System upgrades?
Share with FWS?
NUS/Preposition cost (@$10,000/yr)
Communication/phone lines/repeaters?)
Utilities
Vehicles/Forklifts
Computers

Proposal 2

Current AFS Zones with new added South Zone suppression responsibilities

Jake Dollard - The South Zone responsibilities would have to be operated out of Galena. This would be the most efficient method of operating. Estimated cost @$150,000/yr.

Proposal 3

Modified McGrath Area Proposal (Alternative B) w/added Military-South Zone responsibilities.
[Alternative B - State would keep protection responsibility for an area around McGrath consisting of about 85%State owned land.]

Jake Dollard - The South Zone Suppression organization would operate out of Palmer sharing facilities with DOF. The Zone would need a dedicated fast detection/logistics aircraft. (Dedicate the PC-12 to the Zone for the Zone's fire season?) Estimated cost without the aircraft @$150,000/yr.

Discussion
There was much discussion regarding the State having @103,000,000 acres of land within their Protection Polygon. This would match the acres which they own. The feeling was that the burnable acres within their Protection Polygon should be as close to @90% as possible. Again, matching what they are jurisdictionally responsible for statewide.

Alternative B, moving the current AFS-DOF proposed new boundary line to the west to include an area around McGrath and some area extending out to the Wien Lake/Cosna River area appears to come close to meeting the criteria in the above paragraph. (103M acres; 90% burnable) Included in this Alternative also is the proposal to remove most of the National Parks and Wildlife Refuges east of the new proposed boundary line from State Protection Responsibility and have the Responsibility assumed by the Military-South Zone.

The impacts on the AFS budget were discussed relative to the information provided by the FMOs as to the cost to implement the various Proposals.

The consensus of the group was the AFS could not now afford nor realistically hope to obtain the funds to implement Proposal 1.

There was much discussion regarding the pros and cons of trying to implement Proposals 2 & 3. No decision or recommendation was reached.

The group also discussed keeping the DOI and Native partners involved in what we are doing. The discussion centered around when to get them fully involved rather than just providing an over view of what is going on. The group felt that once AFS and DOF had come to an agreement on which Alternative or what Alternative to pursue, that would be the time to consider doing a video-teleconference to show them what we are thinking.

Next Action
The group decided to schedule one more meeting for Oct. 23. This will give the group time to consider the cost implications of pursuing the different Proposals.

The next meeting will allow for more discussion about the costs, look at the true workload of the different Proposals, and determine how to move forward with discussions with DOF.

The following added to these notes in order to capture the information:

These numbers were developed by the retiring McGrath FMO (Ray Kraemer) in 2011 for a "cost benefit analysis".

• Personal Services (Labor)	759,000
• Ops budget (leases, utilities, travel, messhall, etc.)	148,200
• CWN fixed-wing aircraft (60 days)	160,000
• Temsco Type 2 helicopter (90 day contract)	371,000
• Fueling contract annual guarantee	133,000
Annual Total Cost of Operation	**1,571,200**

WSD User

mroos

AFS_DOF Boundary Follow Up Maps.pdf

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Proposed Protection Agency Boundary



mobile zone personnel

same TO Dispatch

Fire Starts by Fire Cause

1992-2011




DNR Initial Attack
Bases with Historic
Fire Starts 1992-2011
Fire Locations 1992-2011
Cause
False Alarm
Human
Lightning
IA_Helicopter_DNR

Fire Perimeters 1992-2011




Current AFS Boundary
Current DNR Boundary
Proposed DNR Boundary
Proposed AFS Boundary


Legend
Zone Boundary
Bureau of Land Management
National Park System
National Forest System
National Wildlife Refuge System
Native Patent or IC
Native Selected
State Patent or TA
State Selected
Major Military
Private Lands
N
W
E
S

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AFS_DOF Boundary Northeast Zone Org.pdf

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11/13/2012

NORTHEAST ZONE ORG CHART



NEWLY CREATED POSITION

PREVIOUSLY GALENA ZONE

PREVIOUSLY TANANA ZONE

Admin person under SW Zone but will reside where the work is.

LOGISTICS DISPATCHER
GS-0462/07
Vice Davis

IA DISPATCHER
GS-0462/07
Vice Sunderland

WSD User

mroos

AFS_DOF Boundary Proposed SW-SE Zones Org Chart.pdf

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PROPOSED SOUTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST ZONE ORG CHARTS--DRAFT

11/13/2012



LEGEND

- NEW POSITION
- PREVIOSLY GALENA ZONE
- PREVIOUSLY TANANA ZONE

New Positions:

Asst. Center Manager GS-09	$60,000/yr.
Maps and Records/Intel Dispatcher	$40,000/yr.
Admin GS-07/09	$40,000/yr.
Logistics Manager for McGrath GS-09	$60,000/yr.
Career Seasonal (cook)	$35,000/yr.
Helicopter Manager GS-08	$40,000/yr.
Additional Subsistence cost	$20,000/yr.

Total: ~$300,000/yr.


FMO (Northwestern Zone)
GS-0401/12
PFT
AFMO
GS-0401/11
CS
LOGISTICS MGT SPECIALIST
GS-0346/09
CS
SENIOR ZONE FIRE MGMT. SPEC.
GS-0462/08
CS
EFF CREW COORDINATOR
GS-0462/08
CS
DISPATCH CENTER MANAGER
UNIT AVIATION MANAGER
GS-2101/09
CS
COOK
WG-7404/08
CS
WAREHOUSE WORKER
WG-6907/06
CS
FIRE SUPRESSION SPECIALIST
GS-0462/07
CS
Assistant Center Manager
)
AIR OPS. SPECIALIST
GS-2150/09
CS
COOK
WG-7404/6
TMP
WAREHOUSE WORKER
WG-6907/05
CS
Maps and Records Specialist
FIRE SUPRESSION SPECIALIST
GS-0462/07
CS
COOK
WG-7404/06
TMP
CUSTODIAL WORKER
WG-3566/02
TMP
IA DISPATCHER
GS-0462/07
CS
MAINTENANCE MECHANIC
WG-4749/10
CS
FOOD SERVICE WORKER
WG-7408/02
TMP
IA DISPATCHER
GS-0462/07
CS
WAREHOUSE WORKER
WG-6907/05
TMP
FOOD SERVICE WORKER
WG-7408/02
TMP
FIRE DISPATCHER
GS-0462/07
CS
LOGISTICS DISPATCHER
GS-2151/07
CS
FIRE LOGISTICS DISPATCHER
GS-2151/5
CS
LOGISTICS DISPATCHER
GS-2151/07
TMP

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AFS_DOF Boundary South Zone Org.pdf

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
FMO South Zone
GS-12
Admin.
Fire support
GS- 07
(Admin pool)
Fire Management Specialist OR FS
(Planning, WFDSS, and Native liaison)
GS-09
(From FS Shop)
UAM
(Detection Specialist, and COR)
GS-09/11
(From South Zone)
AFMO South Zone
FMO/ FMS Backup and Operations
GS-11
(FS lead position)
Fire Specialist
(training, Helicopter Specialist, and Operations)
GS-07/09
(From FS Shop)
Fire Dispatcher
Intel
GS-9
Fire Dispatcher
Logistics/aircraft?
GS-7
New positions
From existing position

Total Personnel Cost

• FMO (GS-12)	$ 100,000
• AFMO (GS-11)	$ 70,000
• Fire Management Specialist (GS-09)	$ 60,000
• UAM (GS-09/11) Shared funding MLR/ Preparedness	$ 30,000
• Fire Specialist (GS-09)	$ 60,000
• Intel Dispatcher (GS-09)	$ 60,000
• Aircraft Dispatcher (GS-07)	$ 35,000
• Admin (GS-07)	$ 35,000
	$450,000

Cost of New Positions

• FMO (GS-012)	$100,000
• Intel Dispatcher	$60,000
• Dispatcher	$35,000
• UAM Shared position	$30,000
	$225,000

Not Aircraft cost additions.

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mrOOS

AFS_DOF Boundary Stats.pdf

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Xerox® WorkCentre® 7855

DNR Options Summary			
Option	New Boundary Acres	Old Boundary Acres	Change
	13.69	13.69	0.00
Critical	2,312,451.61	2,258,778.19	53,673.42
Full	23,161,066.56	37,492,784.44	-14,331,717.87
Limited	70,829,775.15	96,569,608.06	-25,739,832.91
Modified	8,397,386.04	14,522,007.59	-6,124,621.55
Unplanned	1,567,954.09	1,709,904.47	-141,950.38
Total	106,268,647.13	152,553,096.42	-46,284,449.29

AFS Options Summary			
Option	New Boundary Acres	Old Boundary Acres	Change
	36,401.64	36,401.64	0.00
Critical	640,276.33	693,949.76	-53,673.42
Full	31,391,619.68	17,059,902.99	14,331,716.69
Limited	174,941,764.78	149,201,930.72	25,739,834.06
Modified	30,176,938.07	24,052,316.48	6,124,621.59
Unplanned	203,798.04	61,847.66	141,950.38
Total	237,390,798.53	191,106,349.24	46,284,449.29

New DNR Boundary - Historic Fire Cause

Count of ID

	False Alarm	Human	Lightning	Grand Total
1992		302	23	325
1993		404	100	504
1994		350	57	407
1995		280	30	310
1996		493	67	560
1997		394	62	456
1998		307	21	328
1999		299	56	355
2000		237	22	259
2001	1	284	7	292
2002	28	308	50	386
2003	29	331	21	381
2004	49	321	73	443
2005	40	206	88	334
2006	31	199	10	240
2007	55	196	90	341
2008	29	206	18	253
2009	49	246	67	362
2010	55	263	59	377
2011	51	307	57	415
Grand Total	417	5,933	978	7,328

Old DNR Boundary - Historic Fire Cause

Count of ID

	False Alarm	Human	Lightning	Grand Total
1992		311	11	322
1993		400	107	507
1994		352	73	425
1995		283	26	309
1996		495	55	550
1997		404	142	546
1998		310	16	326
1999		295	31	326
2000		239	13	252
2001		292	4	296
2002	27	311	85	423
2003	30	340	21	391
2004	50	324	58	432
2005	40	215	121	376
2006	30	206	40	276
2007	51	195	79	325
2008	28	206	45	279
2009	48	247	86	381
2010	51	262	64	377
2011	46	304	44	394
Grand Total	401	5,991	1,121	7,513

New AFS Boundary - Historic Fire Cause

Count of ID

	False Alarm	Human	Lightning	Grand Total
1992		41	75	116
1993		64	170	234
1994		28	152	180
1995		28	32	60
1996		31	73	104
1997		47	176	223
1998		16	25	41
1999		21	93	114
2000		25	58	83
2001		50	9	59
2002	6	37	118	161
2003	4	34	55	93
2004	7	41	186	234
2005	17	27	236	280
2006	5	42	47	94
2007	13	35	173	221
2008	3	52	82	137
2009	8	42	131	181
2010	20	74	267	361
2011	6	41	80	127
2012		1		1
Grand Total	89	777	2,238	3,104

Old AFS Boundary - Historic Fire Cause

Count of ID

	False Alarm	Human	Lightning	Grand Total
1992		32	87	119
1993		68	163	231
1994		26	136	162
1995		25	36	61
1996		29	85	114
1997		37	96	133
1998		13	30	43
1999		25	118	143
2000		23	67	90
2001	1	42	12	55
2002	7	34	83	124
2003	3	25	55	83
2004	6	38	201	245
2005	17	18	203	238
2006	6	35	17	58
2007	17	36	184	237
2008	4	52	55	111
2009	9	41	112	162
2010	24	75	262	361
2011	11	44	93	148
2012		1		1
Grand Total	105	719	2,095	2,919

DNR Type 2 Crews

Old Boundary		New Boundary	
Village	# Crews	Village	# Crews
Scammon Bay	1	Minto	2
Lower Kalskag	1	Copper Center	1
Upper Kalskag	1	Kenai	1
Copper Center	1	Tanacross	3
Kenai	1	Northway	2
Tanacross	3	Fairbanks	4
Northway	2	Palmer	1
Fairbanks	4	Delta Junction	2
Palmer	1	Nondalton	2
Delta Junction	2	Total	18
Hooper Bay	3		
Chevak	2		
Shageluk	1		
Aniak	1		
Sleetmute	1		
Nikolai	1		
Nondalton	2		
Total	28		

AFS Type 2 Crews

Old Boundary		New Boundary	
Village	# Crews	Village	# Crews
Kaltag	2	Kaltag	2
Saint Michael	1	Scammon Bay	1
Shungnak	1	Saint Michael	1
Kiana	2	Shungnak	1
Grayling	1	Kiana	2
Minto	2	Grayling	1
Mountain Village	1	Mountain Village	1
Ambler	1	Ambler	1
Arctic Village	1	Arctic Village	1
Noorvik	2	Lower Kalskag	1
Tanana	2	Upper Kalskag	1
Fort Yukon	3	Noorvik	2
Venetie	2	Tanana	2
Beaver	1	Fort Yukon	3
Allakaket	2	Venetie	2
Huslia	2	Beaver	1
Hughes	1	Allakaket	2
Galena	1	Huslia	2
Nulato	2	Hughes	1
Koyukuk	1	Galena	1
Ruby	1	Nulato	2
Koyuk	1	Koyukuk	1
Buckland	1	Ruby	1
Saint Mary's	1	Koyuk	1
Pilot Station	1	Buckland	1
Marshall	1	Saint Mary's	1
Holy Cross	1	Pilot Station	1
Total	38	Hooper Bay	3
		Chevak	2
		Marshall	1
		Holy Cross	1
		Shageluk	1
		Aniak	1
		Sleetmute	1
		Nikolai	1
		Total	48

New
1 = Upper Yukon Zone

- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1

New DNR Boundary - Historic Fire Starts by Mgmt Option

Count of ID							
	CRITICAL	FULL	Limited	MODIFIED	Unplanned	(blank)	Grand Total
1992	239	56	18	10		2	325
1993	316	106	41	41			504
1994	277	72	33	25			407
1995	229	51	10	20			310
1996	388	123	27	22			560
1997	315	101	20	20			456
1998	255	54	8	9		2	328
1999	244	68	29	14			355
2000	193	44	11	11			259
2001	199	64	12	9	3	5	292
2002	271	88	16	14			389
2003	286	80	13	7			386
2004	263	99	56	23		2	443
2005	186	74	42	6		27	335
2006	180	42	8	4		5	239
2007	188	72	48	26		7	341
2008	198	35	11	7		1	252
2009	253	53	48	7			361
2010	251	76	42	9			378
2011	299	72	31	13	1	2	418
Grand Total	5,030	1,430	524	297	4	53	7,338

Old DNR Boundary - Historic Fire Starts by Mgmt Option

Count of ID							
	CRITICAL	FULL	LIMITED	MODIFIED	Unplanned	(blank)	Grand Total
1992	241	63	6	10		2	322
1993	316	106	48	37			507
1994	277	80	41	27			425
1995	228	55	7	19			309
1996	387	124	23	16			550
1997	316	141	41	48			546
1998	256	55	6	7		2	326
1999	240	67	10	9			326
2000	194	43	8	7			252
2001	198	70	11	9	3	5	296
2002	272	93	42	19			426
2003	287	90	12	7			396
2004	262	102	45	21		2	432
2005	186	91	52	21		27	377
2006	182	55	23	10		5	275
2007	187	70	41	20		7	325
2008	198	47	24	9			278
2009	253	67	46	14			380
2010	249	76	41	12			378
2011	298	70	17	10	1	2	398
Grand Total	5,027	1,565	544	332	4	52	7,524

New AFS Boundary - Historic Fire Starts by Mgmt Option

Count of ID							
	CRITICAL	FULL	LIMITED	MODIFIED	UNPLANNED	(blank)	Grand Total
1992	8	27	36	26		19	116
1993	15	48	114	46		11	234
1994	13	43	72	45	7		180
1995	7	21	19	9		4	60
1996	9	23	44	24	4		104
1997	13	66	88	51		5	223
1998	6	9	20	6			41
1999	6	22	67	15		4	114
2000	5	19	41	18			83
2001	4	14	34	5	2		59
2002	11	30	94	22	4		161
2003	13	29	41	10	5		98
2004	8	51	121	48	6		234
2005	8	51	171	49		1	280
2006	9	33	41	9			92
2007	10	54	128	32			224
2008	6	57	63	11		1	138
2009	13	51	96	21			181
2010	8	58	196	90	1	4	357
2011	8	30	69	17			124
2012			1				1
Grand Total	180	736	1,556	554	29	49	3,104

Old AFS Boundary - Historic Fire Starts by Mgmt Option

Count of ID							
	CRITICAL	FULL	LIMITED	MODIFIED	UNPLANNED	(blank)	Grand Total
1992	6	20	48	26		19	119
1993	15	48	107	50		11	231
1994	13	35	64	43	7		162
1995	8	17	22	10		4	61
1996	10	22	48	30	4		114
1997	12	26	67	23		5	133
1998	5	8	22	8			43
1999	10	23	86	20		4	143
2000	4	20	44	22			90
2001	5	8	35	5	2		55
2002	10	25	68	17	4		124
2003	12	19	42	10	5		88
2004	9	48	132	50	6		245
2005	8	34	161	34		1	238
2006	7	20	26	3			56
2007	11	56	135	38			240
2008	6	45	50	9		2	112
2009	13	37	98	14			162
2010	10	58	197	87	1	4	357
2011	9	32	83	20			144
2012			1				1
Grand Total	183	601	1,536	519	29	50	2,918

New DNR Boundary - Historic Acres Burned by Mgmt Option							
Sum of EstAcres							
	CRITICAL	FULL	Limited	MODIFIED	Unplanned	(blank)	Grand Total
1992	147.8	2,453.0	60,876.8	84.0		0.6	63,562.2
1993	173.9	3,019.4	70,642.1	8,623.6			82,459.0
1994	129.6	23,714.3	16,529.0	19,458.0			59,830.9
1995	161.9	4,825.9	4,600.1	16,394.1			25,982.0
1996	37,914.9	49,280.7	51,040.1	41,059.4			179,295.1
1997	496.2	16,372.2	27,175.9	9,193.3			53,237.6
1998	166.6	1,304.3	40,955.0	128.5		176.0	42,730.4
1999	4,412.7	484.3	271,985.2	43,103.6			319,985.8
2000	518.2	41,905.5	205,435.2	10,213.0			258,071.9
2001	162.6	36.6	20.4	6.3	0.0	12.2	238.1
2002	318.9	146,501.1	172,000.6	257,644.1			576,464.7
2003	2,171.8	63,135.6	169,914.8	513.9			235,736.1
2004	227.5	501,779.1	2,153,597.4	30,133.3		0.2	2,685,737.5
2005	616.6	160,554.0	467,589.3	1,306.5		57.1	630,123.5
2006	892.3	203.5	31,416.1	130,252.0		0.4	162,764.3
2007	95.1	64,943.9	114,524.6	783.2		2.7	180,349.5
2008	389.2	251.1	16,090.0	32.4		0.0	16,762.7
2009	1,408.9	14,227.2	1,077,638.0	254.1			1,093,528.2
2010	18,113.6	39,983.5	207,844.6	19,212.2			285,153.9
2011	1,126.6	80,878.0	36,007.6	3,275.3	0.0	24.5	121,312.0
Grand Total	69,644.9	1,215,853.2	5,195,882.8	591,670.8	0.0	273.7	7,073,325.4

Old DNR Boundary - Historic Acres Burned by Mgmt Option							
Sum of EstAcres							
	CRITICAL	FULL	LIMITED	MODIFIED	Unplanned	(blank)	Grand Total
1992	159.9	1,729.1	48,577.2	15.6		0.6	50,482.4
1993	172.9	14,045.0	89,671.7	27,627.9			131,517.5
1994	129.6	67,119.4	25,164.9	10,071.9			102,485.8
1995	161.8	4,830.7	3,945.1	7,634.6			16,572.2
1996	37,914.8	36,840.7	6,361.6	157.0			81,274.1
1997	516.4	17,807.0	965,156.0	75,443.4			1,058,922.8
1998	166.7	654.9	40,788.0	21,916.5		176.0	63,702.1
1999	533.6	465.6	101,264.2	43,540.3			145,803.7
2000	518.3	2,824.6	31,847.6	7.0			35,197.5
2001	162.5	38.1	20.4	6.3	0.0	12.2	239.5
2002	363.5	74,404.1	733,669.2	22,925.0			831,361.8
2003	2,175.2	62,338.7	52,426.0	513.9			117,453.8
2004	227.4	503,132.0	1,625,826.7	10,626.4		0.2	2,139,812.7
2005	616.6	11,081.1	397,627.8	311,206.6		57.1	720,589.2
2006	952.3	423.7	36,325.4	133,299.7		0.4	171,001.5
2007	95.0	65,174.1	70,632.7	70.2		2.7	135,974.7
2008	388.3	974.3	7,142.7	21.6			8,526.9
2009	1,408.9	205,759.3	909,722.6	8,134.2			1,125,025.0
2010	18,113.0	24,706.7	205,067.0	21,025.5			268,912.2
2011	1,126.6	80,884.1	63,901.9	3,273.8	0.0	24.5	149,210.9
Grand Total	65,903.3	1,175,233.2	5,415,138.7	697,517.4	0.0	273.7	7,354,066.3

New AFS Boundary - HistoricAcres Burned by Mgmt Option							
Sum of EstAcres							
	CRITICAL	FULL	LIMITED	MODIFIED	UNPLANNED	(blank)	Grand Total
1992	13.6	959.3	72,770.7	1,600.0		2,809.4	78,153.0
1993	5.1	48,508.9	333,377.5	247,421.0		92.8	629,405.3
1994	1.4	45,351.5	142,992.0	17,285.3	7.9		205,638.1
1995	13.6	1,746.5	12,807.5	3,235.5		144.8	17,947.9
1996	26.7	23,280.4	350,132.6	45,807.8	90.1		419,337.6
1997	86.7	8,812.3	1,788,872.2	175,760.5		4.3	1,973,536.0
1998	1.0	147.7	2,142.1	75,600.0			77,890.8
1999	117.4	19,639.9	631,838.3	6,864.3		3,759.2	662,219.1
2000	4.3	15,153.5	469,777.7	13,277.5			498,213.0
2001	0.3	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0		1.8
2002	211.9	105,148.5	1,453,118.3	51,991.0	25,246.3		1,635,716.0
2003	38.2	2,192.2	309,694.3	2,520.0	59,863.2		374,307.9
2004	135,628.7	129,392.2	2,903,070.8	392,682.4	404,288.9		3,965,063.0
2005	38.3	126,326.0	3,186,708.6	719,946.0		0.0	4,033,018.9
2006	219.3	553.3	86,605.1	18,346.8			105,724.5
2007	1.7	29,183.7	451,164.3	9,309.5			489,659.2
2008	4.6	4,276.5	80,669.9	1,948.0		0.0	86,899.0
2009	45.4	200,576.3	1,604,358.7	53,092.5			1,858,072.9
2010	458.3	13,963.0	633,785.2	192,168.4	1.8	0.0	840,376.7
2011	994.0	678.0	166,518.4	3,619.4			171,809.8
Grand Total	137,910.5	775,891.2	14,680,404.2	2,032,475.9	489,498.2	6,810.5	18,122,990.5

Old AFS Boundary - Historic Acres Burned by Mgmt Option							
Sum of EstAcres							
	CRITICAL	FULL	LIMITED	MODIFIED	UNPLANNED	(blank)	Grand Total
1992	1.5	1,683.2	85,070.3	1,668.4		2,809.4	91,232.8
1993	6.1	37,483.3	314,347.9	228,416.7		92.8	580,346.8
1994	1.4	1,946.4	134,356.1	26,671.4	7.9		162,983.2
1995	13.7	1,741.7	13,462.5	11,995.0		144.8	27,357.7
1996	26.8	35,720.4	394,811.1	86,710.2	90.1		517,358.6
1997	66.5	7,377.5	850,892.1	109,510.4		4.3	967,850.8
1998	0.9	797.1	2,309.1	53,812.0			56,919.1
1999	3,996.5	19,658.6	802,559.3	6,427.6		3,759.2	836,401.2
2000	4.2	54,234.4	643,365.3	23,483.5			721,087.4
2001	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.4
2002	167.3	177,245.5	891,449.7	286,710.1	25,246.3		1,380,818.9
2003	34.8	2,989.1	427,183.1	2,520.0	59,863.2		492,590.2
2004	135,628.8	128,039.3	3,430,841.5	412,189.3	404,288.9		4,510,987.8
2005	38.3	275,798.9	3,256,670.1	410,045.9		0.0	3,942,553.2
2006	159.3	333.1	81,695.8	15,299.1			97,487.3
2007	1.8	28,953.5	495,056.2	10,022.5			534,034.0
2008	5.5	3,553.3	89,617.2	1,958.8		0.0	95,134.8
2009	45.4	9,044.2	1,772,274.1	45,212.4			1,826,576.1
2010	458.9	29,239.8	636,562.8	190,355.1	1.8	0.0	856,618.4
2011	994.0	671.9	138,624.1	3,620.9			143,910.9
Grand Total	141,652.1	816,511.2	14,461,148.3	1,926,629.3	489,498.2	6,810.5	17,842,249.6

Section 8

Southwest Area Proposed Change

Options in Response to

Declining Budgets

February 2014

Table of Contents:

Introduction

In response to a call for proposals for organizational change driven by reductions in operating budget, Southwest Area has developed the following proposed options. Option one addresses a much talked about proposal to simply 'give McGrath back to AFS'. Options two and three propose changes that are supported by maps that will be sent as separate email file attachments as document size with a map appendix exceeded email limits. If any of these options are adopted for further study I can elaborate with more specific details.

Option One: 'Give it' to AFS

First, a few facts:

Alaska Statute 41.15.010 Intent: It is the intent of AS 41.15.010 - 41.15.170 to provide protection from wildland fire and other destructive agents, commensurate with the values at risk, on land that is owned privately, by the state, or by a municipality.

Department of Interior
Department Manual
Part 620: Wildland Fire Management
Chapter 2: General Policy and Procedures - Alaska
2.6 Cooperation: B: The basic responsibility for providing wildland fire suppression service to Departmental lands and Native allotments may not be transferred from the BLM. Where BLM cooperative suppression agreements are in effect, the responsibility for agreement compliance and performance remains with the BLM, subject to the land manager's delegation of authority which shall state suppression standards.

Assumptions based on the above facts:

I. Wildland Fire suppression on land owned by the State of Alaska is the responsibility of the State of Alaska's Division of Forestry. We can't give this responsibility away.

II. Wildland Fire suppression for Department of Interior and Native land in Alaska is the responsibility of the BLM Alaska Fire Service. They can not give this responsibility away.

Recent Developments at the Alaska Fire Service:

The BLM Washington Office reacted decisively to the large suppression costs associated with the Stuart Creek II and Mississippi Fires last summer. Both fires were on Army land and by agreement; all costs were paid by BLM. This agreement, which provides for free rent and utilities on Fort Wainwright for the BLM Alaska Fire Service in exchange for 'no cost' wildland fire suppression on Army lands, was cancelled by the BLM Washington Office. The Army calculated rent and utilities for AFS based on the formula in place for other 'tenants' and the

figure is reported to be 1.9 million dollars per year. AFS has been on Fort Wainwright with no rent or utility costs since its inception in 1981. AFS has no facilities budget and adding elements in the federal budget cycle is a two year process.

AFS has taken budget cuts for the past eight consecutive years. They can no longer hard fund their seasonal temp positions out of their preparedness budget and fund them out of a 'soft fund' fire reimbursable account (LF5710000). This includes Hotshot crew members, Smokejumper rookies and Warehouse temps.

The AFS Galena facility is problematic as the water and sewer infrastructure supported by the former Air Force facility is no longer viable. The AFS Galena office, dispatch, warehouse, shop, kitchen, and ramp facilities now have to have water delivered and sewage pumped and taken away. They used to be on a piped water and sewer system supported by the Air Force. AFS has lost housing capacity (Fourplex) for its employees that was torn down and not replaced. The old Air Force facility was turned over to the Village of Galena and is not being maintained. The AFS Galena facility is going to require above budgeted fiscal support for some time into the future.

There are vast tracts of SOA land in Southwest Alaska that are the responsibility of DOF to protect.

In short, AFS is in no position to 'take over' McGrath and we are in no position to fund the minimum of $1,000,000 stated as the annual cost for AFS to assume DOF protection responsibility in McGrath.

Option Two: Give notice to the BLM Alaska Fire Service that due to current and projected budget cuts, the SOA DOF can no longer protect the current acreage assigned in the Alaska Master Cooperative Wildland Fire Management Agreement (AMCWFMA), Preparedness, Clause 16.

Background:

There has been ongoing talk about the existing 'imbalance of acreage' protected by DOF and in the above AMCWFMA reference we are now projecting 150 million acres as the acreage we protect. It has historically actually been 130 million acres. Somehow, after I left McGrath in April 2006, Southwest Area jumped from 66.6 million acres to 86.6 million acres. I don't know who or what was behind that. The original agreement between AFS and DOF was for AFS not to count acreage on the North Slope and DOF not to claim the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutians. But I am now on Team DOF and my lips are sealed.

As SOA owns +/- 105 million acres, we can claim a protection imbalance of 45 million acres, while we can prove an imbalance of 25 million acres. This gives us two different targets for negotiating change.

Building on the assumptions stated above in Option 1, AFS has no responsibility to take over protection on SOA land, just as we have no responsibility to take over protection on federal or native land.

We don't want to withdraw to a protection polygon of only SOA, municipal and private land as such a proposal is impractical and impossible in modern Alaska. The amount of intermingled land ownership in our state makes this impractical. However, there are large tracts of DOI land currently protected by DOF on which the majority of intermingled ownership, if present, is Native. These are the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Refuges and the National Parks and Preserves. AFS is clearly responsible for providing fire suppression services on these lands.

Proposal: Turn over most of the following National Parks and Preserves and USFWS Refuges to AFS for fire suppression responsibility:

SWA:
Yukon Delta NWR 19,162,416 acres, +/- 6 million acres in AFS Galena Zone
Togiak NWR 4,102,537 acres
Becharof NWR 1,200,059 acres
Alaska Peninsula NWR 1,990,418 acres
Izembek NWR 315K acres
Alaska Maritime NWR 3.41 million acres
Lake Clark National Park and Preserve 2,619,733 acres
Katmai National Park and Preserve 3,674,529 acres

+/- 30.1 million acres total

CRAF:
Wrangell St. Elias National Park and Preserve

13.2 million acres total

KKAF:
Kenai NWR: 1.92 million acres
Kodiak NWR: 1.99 million acres
3.91 million acres total

TAF:
Tetlin NWR: 700K acres

Total potential acres: 47.91 million Acres

Our target reduction is 25 to 45 million acres depending on which base numbers are used. I would suggest sticking with the current 150 million acres protected by DOF leaving an imbalance of 45 million acres to be corrected.

This will certainly be a negotiation with AFS and the Kodak, Kenai and Tetlin Refuges will likely fail to transfer. SWA would hopefully add additional BLM and Native land adjacent to the Yukon Delta NWR to bring numbers up as required. There are also additional Native ownership acres on the east side of the Copper River which haven't been calculated.

Logic: The National Parks and Refuges named above have a fairly low fire occurrence and can be managed by the existing AFS South Zone without a major reorganization. DOF can manage this change with existing areas. This proposal makes SWA more manageable for a reduced staff and potential merger with another existing area management. This proposal makes CRAF more manageable for future change as well.

While on the surface this proposal may not seem to reap an immediate reward, it sets the stage for future DOF organizational change by reducing the complexity of several existing DOF organizations and making reduced operations and staffing, or merging, more viable. SWA would transfer Type II Crew management to AFS for Hooper Bay (3), Chevak (2), Scammon Bay(1), and Shageluk (1); while retaining Kalskag (2), NonDalton (2) and Nikolai (1).

This proposal corrects the imbalance of acres protected by DOF in a manageable manner for both AFS and DOF without huge impacts to either organization.

Both the National Park Service and USFWS have existing fire programs in Alaska that could arguably be characterized as 'underutilized' which could take on more roles with AFS.

Action Items: If this option is pursued it is imperative to inform AFS immediately as they are in the process of rewriting and rehiring the AFS fire position for AFS South Zone. The former FMO position is about to be downgraded to a Fire Management Specialist as that Office has no direct suppression responsibility. This option would constitute a major change in focus for that office. I can fill you in on the fluid history of AFS South Zone if needed.

USFWS has a recently established FMO position in McGrath responsible for fire management on the Innoko, Yukon Delta, and Togiak Refuges. The current USFWS plan to close the Innoko NWR Office in McGrath has resulted in a plan to transfer the FMO position to Anchorage. If this option is selected for action, word needs to get to the USFWS as soon as possible.

Option Three: Phased with budget reductions as they occur:

A. Maintain SWA as an independent reduced size area with reduced and possible integrated interagency staffing and facility cost sharing.

B. Split reduced SWA between Mat-Su and Kenai Areas and transfer of most positions. This would require Palmer Warehouse to assume responsibility for the McGrath Cache operations and some entity to pick up ramp and retardant operations for the McGrath site. In addition Kenai would need to develop some type of forward operating facility at Iliamna –some type of space on, or near the airport with phone and internet. Possibly an RSA with DOT at the airport.

   Dispatch infrastructure will have to be increased to support dispatch expansion by Mat-Su and Kenai to cover radio communication for the new areas of responsibility.

Preferred Option: 2, followed by 3A. Without reducing our overall responsibility (option 2) I don't believe we will be able to significantly change our current operation in Southwest Alaska.

I don't think Option 3 B will be successful as Mat-Su and Kenai will be understaffed to effectively and reliably handle the reduced SWA additions to their areas. In order to realize some actual budget reductions SWA staff will have to be reduced and therefore not available for reassignment. It will require funding above what we currently have to establish communications and aircraft coverage. Both Areas currently lack an assigned fixed wing platform and there is the issue of weather, and Palmer and Kenai being on the wrong side of a very substantial mountain range from the geographic area they are responsible for. Our contracted helicopters are VFR and if the mountains are obscured with clouds they will be unable to respond to Southwest Area from Palmer and Mat-Su. DOF Aviation can't reliably support SWA currently, and with a declining budget, I don't see how that scenario is going to change.

I can elaborate with more reasons if required.

mroos

Microsoft Word - Draft Strategies to Consider if Budget Cuts are Required

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i. Loss of agency administrator on some fires. Would need to rewrite P&PMs if delegated to area foresters, which would be reduced by two with combination of areas.
ii. Lack of some oversight during multiple WFDSS events
iii. Span of control will be increased dramatically in Admin, Fire, and Resources from about 75 employees to 160 employees
iv. Program coordination would be reduced
v. May need an assistant (if so, would basically result in downgrading a regional forester position)

g. Cutting Regional Administrative Officer :
   i. Budget management difficulty would increase
   ii. Invoice payments would be further delayed for the vendors and small businesses
   iii. Workload would increase; possibly doubled
   iv. Managing/supervising remotely may reduce effectiveness in non-supervisory positions

h. Combining Tok/Delta and Copper River/Mat-su:
   i. Timber program would be diminished by replacing Area Foresters (IIIs) with Foresters Is and IIs (cutting a position to add a new position?)
   ii. Loss of safety officer for resources and fire if we lose area forester
   iii. FMOs may need to do more administrative work, which would reduce field presence
   iv. If FMO positions are not filled, under the Staffing and Action Guide, we would need to resource order FMOs all fire season. This also causes loss of AK job when filled by L48 employee.
   v. FMO/AF workload would increase; therefore, work falls through the cracks
   vi. Loss of administrative officer could result in late payments and administrative problems. Workload is already maxed out.

i. Combining Tok/Delta:
   i. Lack of FMOs at Delta and Tok adds to problems if we lose one area forester; although, currently recruiting for both FMOs
   ii. Delta/Tok lacks support staff that "super areas" have.
   iii. Delta and/or Tok could have reductions in firewood, forest practices, timber program
   iv. Reduced DOF presence in Delta and Tok

j. Combining Copper River/Mat-su:
   i. Reduced fire staffing would reduce fire suppression effectiveness in the Copper River area
   ii. Copper River would have little to no firewood, forest practices, timber program
   iii. Lack of community presence in Glennallen/Copper Center

3. Cutting equally across all GF allocations:
   a. Training reduced (reduces the cost of travel and per diem for training)

Draft Strategies to Consider if Budget Cuts are Required
12/01/2014

For this exercise, a five percent reduction in General Funds and Timber Sale Receipts was assumed.

Strategies Considered:

1. Close McGrath (MTM developed 11/04/2014)
2. Cut ½ of McGrath, combine Delta and Tok, combine Copper River and Matsu, and cut some Management positions (MTM developed 11/04/2014)
3. Cut equally across all GF allocations (basic approach identified during MTM 11/04/2014)
4. Eliminate one contracted helicopter, reduce travel/training, cap overtime if applicable, furlough all employees, eliminate positions, and reduce engine fleet (NRF and NRAFs developed 11/19/2014)

Note: A mixture of parts of two or more of the above could be considered as well.

Consequences of:

1. Closing McGrath:
    a. DOF/AFS Master Agreement would need to be modified
    b. State would be responsible for preparedness surcharge (and suppression payments) assuming AFS would protect federal land in McGrath Area
    c. Can BLM give the same level of suppression as DOF and at what cost?
    d. Loss of 22 jobs in rural AK where high unemployment exists
    e. Protection area of BLM would expand skewing the BLM portion to > 50%
    f. Loss of federal reimbursement for DOF suppression on federal land
    g. Loss of providing services to SW AK

2. Cutting ½ of McGrath, combining Delta and Tok, combining Copper River and Matsu, cutting some positions associated with combining areas, and cutting some Management positions:
    a. Responding to fires would increase suppression costs due to slower response and increased fire size
    b. Loss of +/- 11 jobs in rural AK where high unemployment exists
    c. Difficult to run with ½ staff
    d. Delayed response on IA may lead to project fires
    e. Cutting Deputy Director:
        i. Duties would go to director, program managers, regional foresters, and regional administration, which already have full workloads
        ii. Fire Program Manager's time in operations would be reduced
    f. Cutting Regional Forester:

b. Area Foresters have better knowledge of how to cut with minimal adverse impact to forestry programs and the communities
c. Reduced ability to respond to fires
d. Reduced preparedness
e. Reduced building maintenance and vehicles
f. Less disruptive
g. Reduction in services
h. May not have to cut positions?

4. Eliminating one contracted helicopter, reducing travel/training, capping overtime if applicable, furloughing all employees, eliminating positions, and reducing fire truck fleet:
    a. Eliminating one helicopter from preparedness budget and resource order when needed for suppression:
        i. Lack of preparedness
        ii. Costs would increase in suppression
        iii. Reduced ability to IA
        iv. Lose of more values at risk
    b. Reducing budget for travel/training (based on prior years' expenditures) by X%; RFs and/or Program Managers could impose restrictions on travel/training or institute a travel cap per subunit:
        i. Reduced preparedness
        ii. Forces prioritization of trainees/attendees
    c. Furloughing all +/- 250 employees for X days per year (timing to be determined by supervisor/employee negotiation):
        i. Management/Unions coordination
        ii. May need some approval above Division
        iii. May need Unions' approval
        iv. Everyone shares in cutting the budget
    d. Eliminating Deputy Director:
        i. Duties would go to director, program managers, regional foresters, and regional administration, which already have full workloads
        ii. Fire Program Manager's time in operations would be reduced
    e. Eliminating Forest Planner position:
        i. Duties, such as state forest initiatives, would go to the project team leaders
        ii. Reviews of DNR plans would fall to the Regional and Area Foresters
    f. Eliminating Public Information Officer position:
        i. Resource order PIOs for fires
        ii. PIO duties would go to area foresters and administration
    g. Eliminating Communication Forester position:
        i. Duties would go to ETS contractor and communication tech
    h. Eliminating Regional Ground Support (transportation seasonal) positions:
        i. Duties would go to Regional and Area offices
    i. Eliminating non-perm positions:
        i. Duties would go to other staff responsible for the work
    j. Not extending seasonals' normal tour:

i. Some work would not get done

k. Reducing tour from year round to seasonal for Safety Officer
    i. Duties would go to Regional and Area Foresters

l. Reducing fire truck fleet (Fire):
    i. Reduced ability to IA
    ii. Engines may not meet national standards

Other thoughts:

a) Evaluate the need for crews: We can not afford them; White Mt. was formed from Obama stimulus funds that went away so should the crew if we can not get hard funding. Gannett Glacier was originally funded under the Mat-Su Borough and that money has dried up; hard funding needs to happen or they all go away.

b) Duplication of fire fighting efforts; eliminate the response to wildland fires in areas that have a tax based city/borough paid response for fire protection. Consolidate and disseminate those positions throughout the state for proper, consistent state wide staffing requirements and needs i.e. FMO's, AFMO's. Our current work staff is disproportional to the work load by area.

mroos

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Proposed McGrath Reorganization



Introduction

The Governor's 2016 Budget cut sixteen of twenty two positions assigned to the Southwest Area (SWA) effective July 1st 2015. The result is as follows:

Positions Terminated: 16

Admin
AFMO
Aviation Specialist
Lead Dispatcher
Ops Foreman
4 Wildland Fire and Resource Technicians (WFRT)
4 Cooks
Ramp worker
Retardant Site Worker
1 Maintenance

Positions Retained: 6

FMO
2 Dispatchers
Support Foreman
Warehouse
Maintenance

Summary of DOF's Protection Acreage and Population

	Critical	Full	Modified	Limited	Unplanned	Total Acreage	Population
Mat-Su Area	594,357	3,696,586	2,480,379	7,881,649	36	14,653,007	380,821
Southwest Area (McGrath)	103,848	24,925,579	7,749,085	51,194,558	1,744,691	85,717,761	30,816
Kenai Kodiak Area	721,269	1,761,425	1,218,591	3,558,535	33,606	7,293,426	55,400
Totals	698,205	28,622,165	10,229,464	59,076,207	1,744,727	100,370,768	467,037
Delta Area	133,428	1,115,352	264,022	1,799,581		3,312,383	4,000
Fairbanks Area	405,347	2,258,797	823,567	5,003,876	1	8,491,588	99,407
Totals	538,775	3,374,149	1,087,589	6,803,457	1	11,803,971	103,407
Copper River Area	188,901	1,964,540	1,584,525	20,721,411	114	24,459,491	9,636
Tok Area	102,181	1,929,366	322,938	5,755,768		8,110,253	3,000
Totals	291,082	3,893,906	1,907,463	26,477,179	114	32,569,744	12,636


Critical Protection- Acres
594,357
103,848
721,269
Mat-Su Area
Southwest Area (McGrath)
Kenai Kodiak Area
Delta Area
Fairbanks Area
Copper River Area
Tok Area

Full Protection - Acres



Modified Protection - Acres




Limited Protection - Acres
7,881,649
51,194,558
3,558,535
Mat-Su Area
Southwest Area (McGrath)
Kenai Kodiak Area
Delta Area
Fairbanks Area
Copper River Area
Tok Area

Population



Total Acreage



Operational Issues

Following are operational concerns identified by the reorg team with the help of Kenai-Kodiak and MatSu Area staff. These issues will be addressed in our proposed plan for assuming the DOF's wildfire protection responsibilities in Southwest Alaska.

DOF Tech and administrative support from other areas may be needed.

- Need for rotation schedules
  - Dispatch
  - Administration
  - IA Technicians

- Participation on Incident Management Teams may need to be reduced

- Aviation
  - Detection
  - Logistics
  - IA response and support

Operational Issues(continued)

- Statewide as well as national support may be limited due to increased size of protection area with no increase in fire line personnel.

- Training may be reduced due to reduced staff.
  - DOF personnel
  - Fire Departments
  - Village crews
  - EFF
- (SWA training responsibilities include over 1,200 EFFs, 6-12 Type 2 Crews, 22 registered fire departments to 59 registered fire departments)

- Administration of training records, VFA grants, Annual Operating Plans, and Land Use Agreements.

- Maintain relationships with additional native and jurisdictional agencies.

- Communication between Area offices and incidents may be limited.

- Line Officer responsibilities
  - Agency Administrator
  - WFDSS
  - Delegation


DELTA JUNCTION
McGRATH
BETHEL
PALMER
ANCHORAGE
SOLDOTNA
ILIAMNA
DILLINGHAM
DOF Areas
Fire_Management_Zones
<all other values>
REGION
MSS
NSW
SWS
WN
WS
Alaska Division of Forestry
101 Airport Road
Palmer, Alaska

SWA Reorganization Proposal

With the minimal staff remaining at the McGrath facility, the support for basic operational and training needs will require the remaining DOF organization to be tasked with providing support. The following recommendation divides SWA responsibilities between Mat-Su Area Office and the Kenai Kodiak Area Office to provide oversight of assigned portions of the former SWA. Matsu will assume the 'Kuskokwim Basin' and Kenai Kodiak will assume 'Bristol Bay'. In addition, additional DOF program functions and positions are identified to take on support functions previously performed by the SWA operation.


COASTAL REGION FORESTER
FORESTER V M CURRAN
109053-SS ACA 22
MAT-SU AREA
FORESTER IV R JANDREAU
109674-SS ECF 20
KENAI/KODIAK AREA
FORESTER IV H RINKE
109373-SS DQD 20
Support
FORESTER II C OLSON
109426-GG ECF 16
NAT RES TECH III R. DAVIS
109761-GG ECF 14
STUDENT INTERN I NON-PERMS
5 POSITIONS
FORESTER II D ALTER
109474-GG (from Aviation)
ECF 16
ADMIN ASST I/II L BURNS
109354-GG ECF 12/14
OFFICE ASST II V HENDRICKSON
109804-GG ECF 10
ACCT CLK II R TURNER
109094-GG ECF 10
OFFICE ASST II L DOSCHER
109219-GG ECF 10
ADMIN ASST I/II M GAISER
109855-GG DQD 12/14
OFFICE ASST II S MILETTE
109765-GG DQD 20
FORESTER II H KENT
109223-SS DQD 16
FORESTER II J WINTERS
109725-GGDQD 16
FORESTER II N MCDONALD
109274-SS ECF 16
Support
WFR TECH V Vacant
109600-GG(from SL) ECF 15
WFR TECH IV D FINLEY
109210-GG DQD 14
WFR TECH V W HUTTO
109461-SS DQD 15
WFR TECH V P BLYDENBURGH
109226-SS ECF 15
WFR TECH IV M JONES
109320-GG ECF 14
WFR TECH III Z FLEMING
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WF DISPATCHER II/III B METCALF
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WF DISPATCHER I/II W CHRISTOPHER
109450-GG ECF 11/13
WF DISPATCHER I/II T MALLO
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WF DISPATCHER I/II T PARKER
109707-GG EZA 11/13
WF DISPATCHER I/II A ROYERS
109708-GG EZA 11/13
WF DISPATCHER I/II N COX
109739-GG (from SL6) IBA 11/13
WFR TECH V Vacant
*109650-GG (FMO downgraded to AFMO)
ECF 15
STOCK & PRTS SVCS LEAD M COX
109760-LL EZA WG3
MAINT GEN BRNY S STRICKJR
109447-LL EZA WG 4
MAINT GEN S-11 T BAUMGARTNER
109748-LL EZA WG 8
Support
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MAINT GEN LEAD D HIPPCHEN
109454 LLDQD WG 3
MAINT GEN S-11 V SPAHY
109743-LL DQD WG 8
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109703-GG 11/13
WFR TECH IV S SCALES
109706-GG DQD 14
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109702-GG 8/10/12
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109667-GG 8/10/12
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109783-GG 8/10/12
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WFR TECH I/II/III M HAYES DQD
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WFR TECH I/II/III A SEATON DQD
109773-GG 8/10/12
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109502-GG 8/10/12
WFR TECH IV B CARVER
109189-SS ECF 14
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
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ILIAMNA
DILLINGHAM
Alaska Division of Forestry
101 Airport Road
Palmer, Alaska


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ANCHORAGE
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ILIAMNA
Alaska Division of Forestry
101 Airport Road
Palmer, Alaska


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REGION
KKS
MSS
NSW
SWS
Alaska Division of Forestry
101 Airport Road
Palmer, Alaska

Dispatch

- Palmer dispatch would assume a geographic support role for MatSu, Kenai-Kodiak, the Kuskokwim Basin, and Bristol Bay.
  - Transfer aviation dispatcher position from SLC to Mat-Su Dispatch.
  - McGrath dispatch office must be staffed until remote dispatch capability is established.

Aviation

Transfer Coastal Region Aviation Manager from Aviation to Mat-Su Area organization and supervised by the Area Forester. The new Coastal Aviation Manager's duties would include the following:

- Responsible for Palmer, Kenai, and McGrath retardant sites and ramp operations.
- Responsible for fixed wing ramp operations in McGrath and Illiamna as needed.
- Responsible for pilot briefing and flight payment documents and invoicing.
- The manager would be responsible for procuring fuel and administering the fuel contracts.
- Manage remote fueling operations as needed.
- Assign 909AK to Mat-Su/Kenai-Kodiak and establish pilot staffing schedule –detection and mapping specialist.

Move SWA helicopter contract duty station to Palmer.


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ANCHORAGE
SOLDOTNA
ILIAMNA
DILLINGHAM
HAINES
JUNEAU
KETCHIKAN
Alaska Division of Forestry
101 Airport Road
Palmer, Alaska

Administration

Assign 2 coastal region admin positions moved to Mat-Su Area. These positions would be assigned duties in support of the two area's increased responsibilities. Duties could include the following:

- Admin support in the McGrath office as needed.
- IQS database support.
- Hire village crews as needed.
- Manage facility and contracts, invoices, etc.
- Travel, One Card, and TA's
- Meals and lodging
- Support Medic Program

Action Item

- Establish communications infrastructure and internet bandwidth for remote dispatching of Kuskokwim Basin out of Mat-Su dispatch and Bristol Bay out of Kenai Kodiak dispatch.

- Refocus Training as a Fire Program responsibility.

- Training Program will need to emphasize support for remote operations.

- Enter negotiations with AFS on the management of the western portion of the Southwest.

Implementation Timeline

- Notification letters to land managers and village councils detailing reorganization of SWA and new contacts sent when budget passed and reorg official.
- SWA dispatch to work with Mat-Su and Kenai Kodiak dispatch offices to exchange pertinent information on vendors and contacts as soon as reorg is approved.
- SLC aircraft position to be moved to Mat-Su dispatch ASAP and hired as Palmer position.
- Coastal Region Aviation Manager not to be moved to Mat-Su until July 1st 2015
- Coastal Region Admin positions to be moved to Mat-Su July 1st 2015
- Over hire of Kuskokwim Basin AFMO position starting July 1st
- Reclassification of existing position for Bristol Bay AFMO as soon as reorg approved.
- New Staffing and Action Guides for Mat-Su and Kenai Kodiak in place by July 1st 2015.

Implementation Timeline - Continued

- SWA FMO position not to be converted until after the 2015 fire season
- Dispatch positions not to be moved from McGrath into Mat-Su until after 2015 Fire season.
- Should there be a one month overlap between existing positions and transferred positions?

WSD User

mroos

Microsoft Word - Downsizing of McGrath Personnel edited

10/21/19 12:41 PM

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Downsizing of McGrath Personnel

Concerns: Southwest Area (SWA) is a huge geographic expanse covered by seven different weather forecast zones. The severity of the fire season is dependent on fire danger and lightning activity over 80 million acres. One lightning event can produce dozens of fires which can grow very quickly into many large fires. Fuel continuity and delayed response times have been major contributors to large fire growth. In addition, twenty five percent of historical fires in SWA are human caused outside of lightning season.

Smoke jumpers are often used as a source of quick initial attack in the McGrath Area. These resources are limited due to availability from AFS. Smoke jumpers are usually a short term resource which must be replaced within 48 to 72 hours of initial attack. State Forestry wildland fire and resource technicians fill Incident Commander, Logistics, and Operational positions on these fires. Fire fighters have been primarily EFF type II crews. Aircraft support has been with medium helicopters, CWN fixed wing, and retardant aircraft.

Due to the great distances from major services, logistical support to the fire fighters on the ground can be a daunting task. The supply of equipment, supplies, food, water, and additional personnel must be well coordinated. Delivery of supplies via para cargo must be supported with helicopter operations. Fuel availability and fight hours must be managed and preplanning is essential to support the aviation assets.

Crew management must be addressed. The staff to accomplish crew refreshers and basic fire fighter training will no longer exist. Administrative staff will no longer exist to hire crews.

With the minimal staff at the McGrath Area, the support for basic needs will require an Area Office to be tasked with providing personnel to offset the loss of staff in McGrath. The recommendation is either Mat-Su Area or Fairbanks Area to provide the supported needed to be successful.

Administrative: Staff terminated, will need staff in McGrath as well as dedicated staff to process daily bills. Fuel contract invoices represent a significant workload.

Helicopter Operations: Staff terminated, will need helicopter managers, helibase manager,

Fixed Wing/Retardant Site: Staff terminated, will need minimum of 2 personnel to staff retardant site and fixed wing base manager.

Logistic/Dispatch: only 2 staff remain; will need 3-6 support dispatchers to staff fire operations.

Maintenance/Facilities: 3 staff remain, will need additional help 4-6 personnel as activity increases.